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political economists. This thesis compares the writings of four female popularizers—
Maria Edgeworth, Jane Haldimand Marcet, Harriet Martineau, and Margracia Ryves 
Loudon—to those of the political economist Thomas Robert Malthus. Three subjects are 
considered: population, the Poor Laws, and the Corn Laws. This thesis argues that 
Edgeworth, Marcet, and Martineau distilled Malthus’ principle of population into didactic 
literature; that Marcet and Martineau popularized Malthus’ anti-Poor Law arguments 
while supplementing them with original contentions and later advocating for the reforms 
of the New Poor Law; and that Marcet, Martineau, and Loudon argued in favor of 
abolishing the Corn Laws in spite of Malthus’ protectionism. Female popularizers thus 
had an ambivalent relationship with Malthus’ political economy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of the present thesis is three-fold: (1) to illuminate women’s contributions to 
political economy in early 19th century England; (2) to examine the thought of the 
eminent political economist Thomas Robert Malthus; and (3) to assess how the two relate 
to each another. 
The first aim is attended to because in spite of the growing body of specialized 
literature devoted to the study of women in classical political economy, the perception 
that the discipline was solely a male enterprise remains strong. By contrast, this thesis 
demonstrates that women were integral contributors to political economy through the 
production and circulation of knowledge. Invariably, this came in the form of the popular 
text, whether literary or nonfiction. The popular text presented its subject matter in terms 
simple enough to be readily deciphered by the average reader. With minimal jargon, the 
style of the popular text typically resembled the common conversation of the society in 
which it was generated. The popular text’s content was intended to illustrate or append 
the principles contained in theoretical political-economic treatises. As a result, the most 
successful popular texts tended to be best-sellers, read by larger audiences than more 
complex literature. 
An examination of Malthus’ political economy is in order because it continues to 
be influential to modern historians. In English demographic history, a Malthusian 
approach currently dominates the field. The demographic historians E. A. Wrigley and R. 
S. Schofield analyze England’s population history through a Malthusian paradigm in their 
2 
 
Population History of England 1541-1871.1 The work remains the standard account of 
England’s historical demography despite being published nearly four decades ago. More 
recently, the economic historian Kenneth Pomeranz has invoked the political economy of 
Malthus to explain the shared economic constraints characterizing England and China’s 
Yangzi Delta circa the year 1800.2 Both Wrigley and Schofield’s and Pomeranz’ work 
make Malthus’ political economy pertinent to the modern historian. 
Three avenues of inquiry are selected to compare the political economy of British 
women to that of Malthus: population, the Poor Laws, and the Corn Laws. The three 
subjects were fiercely debated in England during the early 19th century. Overall, this 
thesis argues that women’s political economy had an ambivalent relationship with that of 
Malthus. Women popularized his principle of population in didactic literature written to 
influence the behavior of children, adolescents, and adults. They also popularized his 
anti-Poor Law arguments in popular texts, but appended them with original arguments 
and later advocated for reform incompatible with Malthus’ abolitionism. Finally, they 
contradicted Malthus’ protectionism by arguing unequivocally for the abolition of 
protective tariffs on imported grain. The reasons for such a sharp break with Malthus’ 
thought on the Corn Laws are explored in this thesis’ concluding chapter. 
The four women this thesis examines are: Maria Edgeworth, Jane Haldimand 
Marcet, Harriet Martineau, and Margracia Ryves Loudon. All studied political economy 
 
1 E. A. Wrigley and R. S. Schofield, The Population History of England 1541-1971: A Reconstruction 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
2 See Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World 
Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
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at a time when women were barred from receiving higher educations. Brief biographies 
are in order to establish this thesis’ protagonists. 
 
Maria Edgeworth 
Maria Edgeworth was born on January 1, 1768 at Black Bourton, Oxfordshire, in 
England. Her father, Richard Lovell Edgeworth, was of Anglo-Irish descent. He was 
relatively absent from her early childhood. Maria spent her first five years with her 
mother, Anna Maria Elers, at the family home while her father traveled elsewhere. 
Maria’s parents had an unhappy marriage, and subsequent to her mother’s passing in 
1773, Richard remarried after only four months.3 
 Richard Edgeworth’s second marriage to Honora Sneyd significantly changed 
Maria Edgeworth’s life. Honora and Richard’s attention was with one another, and as a 
result they paid little notice to Maria. When they took Maria to visit Edgeworthstown, the 
family estate in County Longford, Ireland, she became very disheartened. Death was 
frequently on her mind during this period and she languished in misery. Despite being 
versed in the latest theories of childhood development, Richard and Honora proved 
incompetent in handling their young daughter’s needs. They sent her to a boarding school 
in London after two years.4 
 During her time in boarding school, Edgeworth markedly changed as she 
attempted to become closer to her parents. She regularly corresponded with both, wanting 
 
3 Claire Denelle Cowart, “Maria Edgeworth (1767-1849),” in Irish Women Writers: An A-to-Z Guide, ed. 
Alexander G. Gonzalez (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2006), 109. 
4 Ibid. 
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their approval and wishing to ameliorate her behavior towards them. Subsequent to 
Honora’s death in 1780, Richard Edgeworth married his deceased wife’s younger sister 
Elizabeth Sneyd. Elizabeth’s relationship with Maria was better than that of her previous 
step-mother, and she became substantially happier. When she returned to 
Edgeworthstown in 1782, Maria became her father’s bookkeeper and secretary while also 
educating her growing number of siblings. Richard Edgeworth married a total of four 
times and fathered 22 children. In 1798, Richard married Frances Beaufort, who was a 
year younger than Maria. The two women became close friends and confided in each 
other regularly.5   
Maria Edgeworth drew upon her experience raising her siblings in her initial 
publications, which were devoted to child education. Her first work was Letters for 
Literary Ladies (1795), followed by The Parent’s Assistant (1796). Next was Practical 
Education (1798), which was co-authored by her father. It combined the educational 
theories of John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Day, William Godwin, Joseph 
Priestley, and Catharine Macaulay.6 Soon Maria graduated to writing fictional works 
such as the immensely popular and critically acclaimed Castle Rackrent (1800).7 
 Her most famous novel, Castle Rackrent satirized contemporary Irish landowners. 
In writing the work, Edgeworth drew upon the history of her own family. Chronicling the 
history of the Rackrent estate, the novel describes abhorrent mismanagement by absentee 
landlords who squander the Rackrent family fortune. The moral of the novel stressed the 
 
5 Ibid., 109-10. 
6 Alan Richardson, Literature, Education, and Romanticism: Reading as Social Practice, 1780-1832 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 52. 
7 Cowart, “Maria Edgeworth,” 110. 
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need for better management by Irish landlords. Maria looked to her father for the 
qualities of the responsible landlords for whom she calls. He had positive relationships 
with his tenants, and—rather than rely upon rent-seeking middlemen—directly 
participated in the estate’s management. Unlike Ricardo, who stressed the law of 
diminishing returns, Maria Edgeworth believed that effective management and 
agricultural science would raise crop yields and reduce food prices. In consequence 
conditions in rural Ireland would improve and political turmoil would be quelled. In 
Edgeworth’s paradigm, the interests of the landlord were in harmony with those of the 
rest of society.8 
 Despite being published anonymously, Castle Rackrent brought Edgeworth fame 
and praise from contemporaries. Her reputation put her into contact with prominent 
public figures of the time during her extended trips across Britain and continental Europe. 
These included Malthus, Ricardo, Marcet, James Mill, Francis Horner, Henry Brougham, 
J. C. Sismondi, Elizabeth Hamilton, Lord Byron, Etienne Dumont, and Walter Scott, 
among others.9 Of Ricardo, Maria wrote that she  
never argued or discussed a question with any person who argues more fairly or 
less for victory and more for truth. He gives full weight to every argument 
brought against him, and seems not to be on any side of the question for one 
instant longer than the conviction of his mind of that side. It seems quite 
indifferent to him whether you find or truth, or whether he finds it, provided it be 
found.10 
 
 
8 William Kern, “Maria Edgeworth and Classical Political Economy,” Committee on the Status of Women 
in the Economics Profession Newsletter, American Economic Association, Winter 1998, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20110725212131/http://www.cswep.org/edgeworth.html. 
9 Ibid.; Cowart, “Maria Edgeworth,” 110. 
10 Piero Sraffa, ed., The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1951), 10:168-9. 
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Rather than expounding upon Ricardo’s theories, Maria Edgeworth’s 
quintessential literary exposition of political economy was an illustration of Adam 
Smith’s division of labor. It was a short story for children entitled “The Cherry Orchard,” 
detailing how the subdivision of tasks entails a gain in overall efficiency.11 About the 
story, Marcet wrote that if mothers “could convey [to their children] such lessons of 
political economy as Miss Edgeworth gives in her story of the Cherry Orchard, no one I 
should think would esteem such information beyond the capacity of a child.”12 
After the death of her father in 1825, Maria Edgeworth wrote sparingly. By this 
time her fame had dwindled, and she mostly contented herself with the affairs of the 
family estate. During the Great Famine of the 1840s, she threw herself into the relief 
effort. She successfully appealed to the United States and England for aid, relieved 
farmers with grain, and supplied large numbers of the poor with shoes. Maria died of a 
heart attack in Edgeworthstown on May 22, 1849.13 
 
Jane Haldimand Marcet 
Jane Haldimand Marcet was born on January 1, 1769 to the Swiss citizen Anthony 
Francis Haldimand and the Englishwoman Jane Pickersgill. The oldest of ten children, 
she was raised in London where her father had amassed a fortune from banking and real-
estate development. She was educated in the household and was taught the same subjects 
as her brothers according to Swiss custom. Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations was among 
 
11 Maria Edgeworth, “The Cherry Orchard,” in Early Lessons (London: R. Hunter, 1815), 1:248-78. 
12 [Jane Haldimand Marcet,] Conversations on Political Economy; in Which the Elements of that Science 
are Familiarly Explained (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1816), 12. 
13 Cowart, “Maria Edgeworth,” 110. 
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the materials from which she was taught. When Jane was 15, she experienced a sudden 
end to her childhood as her mother died while giving birth. Her father subsequently 
required Jane to oversee the household and entertain guests at large parties. At these 
gatherings, which quickly became meetings of the London intelligentsia, Jane met her 
future husband Alexander Marcet, a Swiss physician residing in London.14 
 After ending an engagement with a cousin due to disapproval from her father, 
Jane found herself single at 30 years old. Yet she was attractive to suitors as she stood to 
inherit a large fortune from her father’s banking activities. In contrast to the prevailing 
custom at the time, Jane’s father allowed her to pick from the men according to her fancy. 
Alexander Marcet presented his case to Jane and she subsequently accepted his marriage 
proposal. After a short engagement, the two married in December of 1799.15 
 Jane’s ties with the London financial community were strengthened when in the 
1810s her younger brother William Haldimand became the youngest ever director of the 
Bank of England. Because of her financial ties she came into contact with Ricardo, whom 
she hosted regularly during discussions of contemporary monetary policy. A frequent 
topic of discussion at that time was the Bullion Controversy. Jane Marcet, William 
Haldimand, and Ricardo all maintained that the Bank of England should restore the 
convertibility of bank notes into gold to combat inflation. Soon after the Bullion 
Controversy, the subject of the Corn Laws became intensely debated by parliament and 
 
14 Bette Polkinghorn, “Jane Haldimand Marcet (1769-1858),” in A Biographical Dictionary of Women 
Economists, eds. Robert W. Dimand, Mary Ann Dimand, and Evelyn L. Forget (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2000), 281; Bette Polkinghorn and Dorothy Lampen Thomson, Adam Smith’s Daughters: Eight 
Prominent Women Economists from the Eighteenth Century to the Present (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
1998), 1-2. 
15 Ibid. 
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was inevitably a topic of conversation at the salon in Jane’s household. It is likely that 
Jane formed many of the opinions she expressed on the Corn Laws during this time. She 
came to the conclusion that more widespread knowledge of political economy would go 
far to improve the situation of the nation. She thus wrote and anonymously published 
Conversations on Political Economy (1816), a series of dialogues outlining the principles 
of political economy. Despite being expressly written for adolescents, it was read by 
many adults. As we will see in chapter two, it was critically acclaimed and universally 
praised.16 
 Jane’s second work of political economy was published 17 years after the first 
appearance of the Conversations. After labor unrest in the English countryside in the fall 
of 1830, the new work was commissioned to educate workers in the fundamentals of 
political economy. The work was published anonymously as John Hopkins’s Notions on 
Political Economy (1833), a collection of short stories centering upon the agricultural 
worker John Hopkins and his large family.17 Like the Conversations, it was critically 
acclaimed. The prestigious Edinburgh Review, for example, praised the work: “Mrs. 
Marcet has resumed her valuable labours in the unpretending little volume which heads 
our article. It is delightfully written, and is admirably adapted, by plain and 
straightforward sense, for its virtuous purpose, the improvement of the laboring 
 
16 Ibid., 282. 
17 Ibid., 284. 
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classes.”18 John Hopkins’s Notions on Political Economy was successful enough to go 
through at least three editions.19 
 Eighteen years would pass between Hopkins’s Notions and Jane’s final book on 
political economy, Rich and Poor (1851).20 Perhaps because it was written for children, it 
remains understudied to the present day. Regretfully, the present thesis does not examine 
the work in any depth. It is a slim work, constituting a total of only 75 pages. It is set in a 
rural village in which the schoolmaster Mr. B. teaches a group of boys lessons in political 
economy. Labor, profits, capital, machinery, price, wages, trade, money, and banks are 
all covered. The work’s main contention—the harmony of interests between all classes—
is reiterated ad nauseum. It appears to have nothing to do with Malthus’ political 
economy. 
 Jane wrote a plethora of other introductory works on subjects ranging from 
Christianity to Chemistry to Botany. In the vein of Maria Edgeworth, she authored 
several collections of children’s stories. By the end of her life, Jane Marcet authored a 
total of 30 books. At the age of 89, she died on June 28, 1858 in her daughter and son-in-
law’s London home.21 
 
 
 
18 Unsigned review of John Hopkins’s Notions of Political Economy, by the author of Conversations on 
Political Economy, and Illustrations of Political Economy, by Harriet Martineau, Edinburgh Review (April 
1833), 2. 
19 [Jane Haldimand Marcet,] John Hopkins’s Notions on Political Economy, 3rd ed. (London: Longman, 
Rees, Orme, Brown, Green, & Longman, 1834). 
20 Mrs. Marcet, Rich and Poor (London: Longman, Brown, Green, & Longmans, 1851). 
21 Polkinghorn, “Marcet,” 285. 
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Harriet Martineau 
Born in Norwich on June 12, 1802, Harriet Martineau was the sixth child out of eight of 
Elizabeth Rankin Martineau and Thomas Martineau, a textile manufacturer. Her family 
was Unitarian and Harriet was initially educated in the household, where her eldest 
brother taught her Latin. In 1813 to 1815 she attended a school run by the Reverend Isaac 
Perry. After Perry departed from Norwich, Martineau’s studies were confined to the 
household.22 
 Harriet was a sickly child and suffered from various ailments as a youth. Her 
progressive deafness began during the years she attended school in Norwich. Her other 
senses were impacted by her health and she claims to never have been able to taste or 
smell. She began to read philosophy while under the influence of the Unitarian minister 
Lant Carpenter, whom she met while at her maternal uncle’s Bristol home in 1817. Her 
first literary contributions were articles submitted to Unitarian periodicals about 
religion.23 
 Her family faced serious financial difficulties during the crisis of 1825, and the 
death of her father one year later eventually propelled Harriet into a writing career out of 
necessity. She entered a literary contest held by the Central Unitarian Association in 1829 
that gave prizes for worthy essays meant to convert those of other religious persuasions. 
The association awarded Harriet with 45 guineas, which she used in 1831 to visit her 
brother James Martineau in Dublin. There she formulated a plan to write a series of 
 
22 Evelyn L. Forget, “Harriet Martineau (1802-76),” in A Biographical Dictionary of Women Economists, 
eds. Robert W. Dimand, Mary Ann Dimand, and Evelyn L. Forget (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000), 294. 
23 Ibid. 
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fictional tales intended to illustrate the principle of political economy. She had learned 
the science principally from Marcet’s Conversations and James Mills’ Elements of 
Political Economy. She initially struggled to find a publisher, but eventually came to an 
arrangement with Charles Fox to publish the series. Illustrations of Political Economy 
begun to be published in February of 1832 and by the tenth of February the first edition 
of 1500 copies sold out. Fox subsequently printed 5000 more to meet demand.24 
 In total the series had twenty-five installments. It became a best seller, as the 
installments sold 10,000 copies per month. However, critical reception was unequally 
divided on the Illustrations of Political Economy. For the most part the periodical press 
was favorable towards the series. John Stuart Mill gave the summary volume a positive 
review, writing that “as an exposition of the leading principles of what now constitutes 
the science, it possesses considerable merit.”25 The Edinburgh Review particularly 
commended “Ella of Garveloch,” “Weal and Woe in Garveloch,” and “A Manchester 
Strike:” arguing that the three “are so beautiful in their poetry and their painting, and so 
important in their moral, that, were we to begin to praise them, we should not know 
where to stop.”26 And yet, as noted in chapter two, Martineau’s reputation was 
considerably damaged after the anti-Malthusian political economist George Poulett 
Scrope gave the series an extremely negative review in the ultra-Tory Quarterly Review. 
Nevertheless, public figures viewed the series in a better light. Princess Victoria and the 
poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge eagerly anticipated each new installment. Richard Cobden 
 
24 Ibid., 294-5. 
25 [John Stuart Mill,] “On Miss Martineau’s Summary of Political Economy,” The Monthly Repository 8 
(1834), 321. 
26 Unsigned review of John Hopkins’s Notions of Political Economy, by the author of Conversations on 
Political Economy, and Illustrations of Political Economy, by Harriet Martineau, Edinburgh Review (April 
1833), 26. 
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gave the series public support, and Robert Peel sent a letter of congratulations to 
Martineau. Robert Owen unsuccessfully petitioned Martineau to illustrate his social 
theory in literary form.27 
 Martineau wrote the Illustrations of Political Economy while in her early thirties, 
and never returned to the subject of political economy afterwards. She remained a prolific 
writer, authoring many novels and nonfictional works throughout the rest of her days. In 
her private life she was devoted to philanthropy despite the limitations of her income. 
Like Maria Edgeworth, she never married. She died on June 27, 1876 at the age of 74.28 
 
Margracia Ryves Loudon 
Unfortunately, the details of Margracia Ryves Loudon’s life are very scarce. Her date of 
birth is estimated to be 1788 at her family’s estate of Castle Ryves in County Limerick, 
Ireland. She was probably a Unitarian. Her own literary works were precedented by that 
of her mother, Frances Catherine Ryves. In 1812 the elder Ryves published Cumbrian 
Legends; or, Tales of Other Times, a poetic narrative inspired by a visit to the Lake 
District in 1806.29 Upon the death of her father in 1817, Margracia moved with her sisters 
and mother to Bath in the county of Somerset, England. The family soon sold the Castle 
Ryves estate. Margracia married the Scottish physician Charles Loudon, he thirteen years 
her junior, at the age of 42.30 Charles was a fervent opponent of Malthus, arguing against 
 
27 Forget, “Martineau,” 295; Polkinghorn and Thomson, Adam Smith’s Daughters, 25. 
28 Polkinghorn and Thomson, Adam Smith’s Daughters, 27; Forget, “Martineau,” 296. 
29 Mrs. Ryves, Cumbrian Legends; or, Tales of Other Times (Edinburgh: T. Allan, 1812). 
30 Sarah Richardson, The Political Worlds of Women: Gender and Politics in Nineteenth Century Britain 
(New York: Routledge, 2013), 5-6. 
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the political economist’s views on population in a small pamphlet of 1836 and a large 
book of 1842.31 In 1846, after the death of Charles and while living in Paris, Margracia 
wrote to the British Prime Minister Robert Peel requesting she be considered for a 
pension. The request was not granted, as the letter arrived shortly after Peel resigned on 
June 29, 1846 subsequent to repealing the Corn Laws.32 Margracia appears to have 
converted to a communitarian form of socialism in her later years, as her novel Maternal 
Love (1849) advocated for common ownership of the means of production.33 The relevant 
passages from the novel were excerpted in Robert Owen’s Journal in 1851.34 Margracia 
died in Cheltenham ten years later.35 
 Margracia released five novels,36 three political treatises,37 and a number of 
articles in her lifetime.38 All remain understudied. The work of Margracia’s which this 
 
31 Charles Loudon, The Equilibrium of Population and Sustenance Demonstrated (Leamington-Spa: John 
Fairfax, 1836); Charles Loudon, Solution du problem de la population etc de la subsistence; soumise à un 
médicin dans une série de lettres (Paris: A. et W. Galignani, 1842). See also Patrice Bouche, “The Post-
Malthusian Moment: Some Responses to Population Explosion in Britain c. 1840,” in From Malthus’ 
Stagnation to Sustained Growth: Social, Demographic and Economic Factors, eds. Bruno Chiarini and 
Paolo Malanima (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 160-77. 
32 On repeal, see Douglas A. Irwin, “Political Economy and Peel’s Repeal of the Corn Laws,” Economics 
and Politics 1, no. 1 (1985), 41-59, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00004.x. 
33 Margratia [sic] Loudon, Maternal Love: A Novel (London: Thomas Cautley Newby, 1849), 3:28: “let the 
inhabitants of parishes arrange themselves into mutual assurance companies, bound to let no individual sink 
under private misfortune: let these companies hire or purchase land to farm in common; hire or purchase 
machinery to manufacture in common; and train and educate their children together: let their common 
garden be their children’s play-ground; their common farm their agricultural school; and the factories and 
workshops their schools of industry.” 
34 “A Chapter from Mrs. Loudon’s ‘Maternal Love,’” Robert Owen’s Journal, June 23, 1851. 
35 Richardson, Political Worlds, 73-4. 
36 [Margraica Ryves Loudon,] First Love: A Novel, 3 vols. (London: Saunders and Otley, 1830); 
[Margracia Ryves Loudon,] Fortune-Hunting: A Novel, 3 vols. (London: Henry Colburn and Richard 
Bentley, 1832); [Margracia Ryves Loudon,] Dilemmas of Pride, 3 vols. (London: Bull and Churton, 1833); 
Loudon, Maternal Love; Mrs. Margracia Loudon, The Fortunes of Woman: A Novel (New York: Stringer 
and Townsend, 1849). 
37 Mrs. Loudon, Philanthropic Economy; or, the Philosophy of Happiness, Practically Applied to the 
Social, Political, and Commercial Relations of Great Britain (London: Edward Churton, 1835); Mrs. 
Loudon, The Light of Mental Science; Being an Essay on Moral Training (London: Smith, Elder, and Co., 
1845); Mrs. Loudon, The Voice of Bulgaria. From Authentic Sources (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 
1846). 
38 E.g. Margracia Loudon, “How to Raise Capital for Co-operative Purposes,” The Leader, January 11, 
1851. 
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thesis investigates is her Philanthropic Economy; or, the Philosophy of Happiness 
(1835), published when she was around the age of 47. It became widely known to 
contemporaries for its arguments in favor of the abolition of the Corn Laws when the 
Anti-Corn Law League distributed a pamphlet with extracts from it to nine million 
electors in the early 1840s.39 The Corn Law rhymer Ebenezer Elliot even wrote a poem 
praising Loudon.40 Yet Philanthropic Economy also called for universal rights, universal 
suffrage, the abolition of the House of Lords, the abolition of primogeniture, Poor Laws 
for Ireland, church reform, municipal reform, a property tax to replace direct taxes, and 
for the poor to be allowed to cultivate allotments of wasteland. It is a work more complex 
than what it became known for. Nevertheless, the two scholarly works dedicated to 
analyzing Philanthropic Economy have not investigated its anti-Corn Law arguments.41 
An examination of its stance on the Corn Laws is long overdue. 
Philanthropic Economy represented the first attempt by a woman to contribute to 
the discourse of political economy subsequent to the severe criticism Harriet Martineau 
received in the Quarterly Review. Though Philanthropic Economy received several 
negative reviews,42 mostly from conservative and Tory periodicals, the liberal and radical 
 
39 See Corn Laws. Selections from Mrs. Loudon’s Philanthropic Economy (Manchester: J. Gadsby, 1842). 
40 Edwin Elliott, ed., The Poetical Works of Ebenezer Elliot (London: Henry S. King & Co., 1876), 2:106-
7: “Doctor, I send you, with this scrawl, / A thing by no means common; / For, by the Power that made us 
all, / I send—a perfect woman! … Oh, thanks to Loudon and to thee, Sword-breaking might of letters! 
Enfranchised woman shall set free / The slave who forged her fetters!” 
41 See Richardson, Political Worlds; and Patrice Bouche, “L’exemplum narrative dans la Philanthropic 
Economy de la romancière Margracia Loudon,” in L’Exemplum Narratif dans le discours argumentative, 
ed. Manuel Borrego-Pérez (Besançon: Presses Univ. Franche-Comté, 2002), 67–78. 
42 E.g. Unsigned review of Philanthropic Economy, by Mrs. Loudon, The Metropolitan 14, no. 54 (October 
1835), 33-5; Unsigned review of Philanthropic Economy, by Mrs. Loudon, The Monthly Repository 9 
(December 1835), 434-5; Unsigned review of Philanthropic Economy, by Mrs. Loudon, The Monthly 
Review 2, no. 2 (June 1835) 
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presses were favorable.43 The Analyst warmly received Loudon’s work, stating “we were 
really astonished to find a lady possessed of sufficient courage to enter the lists in so 
disputatious and perilous a fiend” as political economy.44 The most extensive review 
came from The Westminster Review, which argued that Margracia differentiated herself 
from the women political economists who preceded her: “Mrs. Loudon is no lesson-
player, but draws directly upon the resources of her own genius for success.”45 To be 
sure, much of Philanthropic Economy cannot be traced to Margracia’s political 
economist predecessors and most likely can be credited to her own mind. But the plea to 
abolish the Corn Laws, as chapter four argues, is a different story. As Margracia explains 
in her preface, Philanthropic Economy condenses the wisdom of “ponderous volumes” 
on the prevailing misery of the working classes into a succinct tract “couch[ed] in the 
plain, unscientific phrases of common conversation.”46 It distills the fundamental 
principle of free trade taken from the prevailing political economists into a work 
intelligible to the general public. In short, Margracia does not rely solely upon her own 
intellect when criticizing the Corn Laws. She resembles the women political economists 
who predate her, as they too argued for the abolition of the laws in works intended for 
popular audiences. 
 
 
 
43 See Unsigned review of Philanthropic Economy, by Mrs. Loudon, The Gentleman’s Magazine 4 (August 
1835), 172-4; Unsigned review of Philanthropic Economy, by Mrs. Loudon, Tait’s Edinburgh Magazine 
(July 1835), 484. According to Richardson, Philanthropic Economy was also reviewed in the Spectator, the 
Courier, the Sunday Herald, and the Sun. 
44 Unsigned review of Philanthropic Economy, by Mrs. Loudon, The Analyst 2 (1835), 427. 
45 Unsigned review of Philanthropic Economy, by Mrs. Loudon, The Westminster Review 23, no. 45 (July 
1835), 1. 
46 Loudon, Philanthropic Economy, v-vi. 
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II. POPULATION 
When women … have turned their minds—as they have done too seldom—to the 
exposition or arrangement of any branch of knowledge, they have commonly exhibited, 
we think, a more beautiful accuracy, and a more uniform and complete justness of 
thinking, than their less discriminating brethren … No man, we will venture to say, could 
have written the Letters of Madam de Sevigné, or the Novels of Miss Austin, or the 
Hymns and Early Lessons of Mrs Barbauld, or the Conversations of Mrs Marcet. These 
performances, too, are not only essentially and intensely feminine, but they are, in our 
judgment, decidedly more perfect than any masculine productions with which they can be 
brought into comparison. 
Francis Jeffery47 
The ladies seem determined to make the science of Political Economy peculiarly their 
own. Our first instructor in this difficult branch of study was Mrs. Marcet, and a clearer 
or more judicious teacher we have not since encountered. Miss Edgeworth too has 
occasional dissertations, which shew what she could have done in that department had 
she applied her mind to it. And now Miss Martineau comes forward to embody the most 
abstract, but at the same time most important principles of the science, in narratives 
which have all the value of truth and all the grace of fiction. After all, we believe that 
there is something in the female mind which peculiarly fits it for elucidating, in a familiar 
manner, the intricacies of political economy. 
Christian Isobel Johnstone48 
 
Women have had a vital presence in the history of economic thought since the time of 
classical political economy. But too frequently they have been overshadowed by their 
male contemporaries. For a single mention of Maria Edgeworth, Jane Haldimand Marcet, 
or Harriet Martineau, one finds references to Smith, Malthus, and Ricardo in abundance. 
The dearth of coverage on these women in the historiographical record is not 
commensurate with their importance, as they performed an essential function by making 
the ideas of political economy accessible to a larger audience than theoretically-oriented 
 
47 Francis Jeffery, review of Records of Woman and The Forest Sanctuary, by Felicia Hemans, The 
Edinburgh Review no. 99 (October 1829), 33. 
48 Christian Isobel Johnstone, “Miss Martineau’s Illustrations of Political Economy,” Tait’s Edinburgh 
Magazine 1, no. 5 (August 1832), 612-3. 
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political economists could reach. As these women intended their writings to be used as 
educational material, their primary task had been to distill the fundamental principles of 
political economy into didactic literature for mass consumption by a general audience. 
They sought to mold the behavior of the reading individual to fit the precepts of political 
economy. In this they abided by the maxim expressed by Malthus that the “science of 
political economy is essentially practical, and applicable to the common business of 
human life.”49 Centering on consumption and reproduction, this chapter argues that 
Edgeworth, Marcet, and Martineau imbued Malthus’ principle of population into didactic 
literature intended for the practical application of his theory to everyday life. In stories 
for children, dialogs for adolescents, and novels for adults, the three warned that 
unrestrained reproduction would be met with catastrophic consequences. The cessation of 
such didactic works can be traced back to the Cambridge economist Alfred Marshall, 
who delegitimized them to make “economics” (his preferred term) an exclusively male 
discipline. This has had serious historiographical consequences, with women political 
economists occupying little more than passing comments and footnotes in canonical 
histories of economic thought like Schumpeter’s History of Economic Analysis and 
Winch’s Riches and Poverty.50 
 
 
49 Thomas Robert Malthus, Principles of Political Economy Considered with a View to their Practical 
Application (London: John Murray, 1820), 12. 
50 Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, ed. Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter (New York: 
Routledge, 2006), 452n12, 618, 637, 1137; Donald Winch, Riches and Poverty: An intellectual history of 
political economy in Britain, 1750-1834 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 419. Of the 
three, Schumpeter focuses solely on Marcet, while Winch neglects Edgeworth entirely and mentions 
Marcet and Martineau only in passing. The exception to the rule is Mark Blaug, who examined Martineau 
at length in his Ricardian Economics: A Historical Study (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), 129-
39. 
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Popularizing Political Economy 
The writings of Edgeworth, Marcet, and Martineau can be viewed as a part of the 
movement to make political economy popular amongst the public in early 19th century 
England. Male political economists too published their share of introductory texts during 
this time. The works of two Ricardians named Thomas are particularly revealing.  Known 
more for his literary works, Thomas de Quincey released in 1824 his quasi-platonic 
discourse on Ricardian political economy—“The Templars’ Dialogues”—in the London 
Magazine.51 Three years later, Thomas Hodgskin published a series of introductory 
lectures he delivered to the London Mechanics’ Institute on political economy.52 These 
two works exemplify the literary and popular character that many introductory texts 
possessed.53 The most striking example, however, is from an opponent of Ricardo: Jean-
Baptiste Say. Say had his Catechism of Political Economy translated into English in 1816 
and four years later appended it to his Letters to Mr. Malthus.54 In the Catechism, Say 
presents the main topics of political economy in clear, direct, and simple language. 
Utilizing a question-and-answer format, he frequently reiterates what he has previously 
 
51 Thomas de Quincey, De Quincey’s Writings (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1850-9), 20:255-347. For his 
major contribution, The Logic of Political Economy, see Writings, 22:5-220. For his opium-fueled 
encounter with Ricardo’s Principles, see Writings, 1:91-4. Schumpeter was characteristically dismissive of 
de Quincey—of The Templar’s Dialogues he wrote: “let us bow to the editor who published such material 
and to the reading public who did not thereupon discontinue subscription.” See Schumpeter, Analysis, 
452n13. 
52 Thomas Hodgskin, Popular Political Economy. Four Lectures Delivered at the London Mechanics’ 
Institution (London: Charles Tait, 1827). 
53 See also Richard Whately, Easy Lessons on Money Matters; for the Use of Young People (London: John 
W. Parker, 1833); and W. D. Sockwell, Popularizing Classical Economics: Henry Brougham and William 
Ellis (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994). 
54 Jean-Baptiste Say, Catechism of Political Economy; or, Familiar Conversations on the Manner in Which 
Wealth in Produced, Distributed, and Consumed in Society, trans. John Richter (London: Sherwood, Neely, 
and Jones, 1816); Jean-Baptiste Say, Letters to Mr. Malthus, on Several Subjects of Political Economy, and 
on the Cause of the Stagnation of Commerce. To Which is Added A Catechism of Political Economy, or 
Familiar Conversations on the Manner in Which Wealth is Produced, Distributed, and Consumed in 
Society, trans. John Richter (London: Sherwood, Neely, and Jones, 1821). See also Evelyn L. Forget, The 
Social Economics of Jean-Baptiste Say: Markets and Virtue (New York: Routledge, 1999). 
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written and provides concrete examples to illustrate abstract principles, making the work 
an effective primer for the novice. But he also presents his own idiosyncratic view that 
value is determined by utility as though it stood unchallenged amongst political 
economists.55 Probably for self-serving reasons and to avoid confusion, Say neglected to 
mention the predominant view that labor was the determinant factor in value, though 
utility was recognized as the resolvent factor in use-value.56 Utility became the dominant 
heuristic only with the so-called “marginal revolution,”57 a process which began in the 
English-speaking world with the 1871 publication of William Stanley Jevons’ Theory of 
Political Economy.58  
The disagreement on value reveals a weakness inherent to popular works: 
contestable claims may be presented as established truth. In a March 30, 1818 letter to the 
Genevan philosopher and brother-in-law of Marcet Pierre Prévost, Malthus thus 
maintained that it is more appropriate “in an Elementary work … to dwell upon the rule 
[rather] than the exception and without an opportunity of entering pretty fully into the 
subject, it [is] more advisable to consider only the great general principle.”59 Hence he 
found “no cause for regret” that Marcet “in her excellent conversations in Political 
Economy” advocated for the unrestricted free train of cereal grains, a position at odds 
with Malthus’ contention that the corn trade “forms one of the very few exceptions to a 
 
55 Say, Catechism, 5-7. 
56 As Malthus noted, use-value is “synonymous with Utility. It rarely occurs in political economy, and is 
never implied by the word value when used alone.” See Thomas Robert Malthus, Definitions in Political 
Economy (London: John Murray, 1827), 235. 
57 See Mark Blaug, “Was There a Marginal Revolution?” History of Political Economy 4, no. 2 (1972), 
269-80, https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-4-2-269. 
58 William Stanley Jevons, The Theory of Political Economy (London: Macmillan and Co., 1871), 2: “value 
depends entirely upon utility.” Emphasis original. 
59 George William Zinke, “Six Letters from Malthus to Pierre Prévost,” The Journal of Economic History 
2, no. 2 (November 1942), 177, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700052566. 
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general freedom of trade.”60 Similarly, for Malthus the popular work should maintain that 
it is labor which gives commodities their exchangeable value, despite the exceptional 
view of Say who argued in favor of utility.61 Say evidently saw the matter differently, 
using the elementary work as a venue to platform his own views on the subject. Putting 
aside the debate on the proper content of the introductory work in the writings of male 
and female popularizers, it is evident that the wide diffusion of political-economic 
knowledge throughout society commanded a major consensus at the time. 
It would be a mistake, however, to wholly equate the female popularizers with 
their male counterparts. Though the three had also written for mass consumption, 
Edgeworth, Marcet, and Martineau imbued their works with an explicitly didactic 
character to meliorate the behavior of their readers. Much effort to this end went towards 
circulating knowledge of Malthus’ principle of population amongst all ages of the public. 
All three women knew Malthus personally, and if they did not acquire extensive 
knowledge of his principle through reading his Essay on the Principle of Population, they 
certainly had the opportunity to do so through personal communication. 
But this feat was itself not an easy task; Malthus was born with an orofacial cleft 
and had difficulty being understood in speech.62 The observations of Edgeworth and 
Martineau attest to Malthus’ birth defect of which we otherwise have so little evidence.63 
 
60 Ibid. 
61 In spite of this, Marcet argued that utility is the resolvent factor in exchange value: “labour … is valuable 
only if it gives utility to an object.” See [Marcet,] Conversations, 273. Marcet’s agreement with Say likely 
accounts for his emphatic praise (see below). 
62 See Montserrat Diaz, Mar Llorente, and Victor Asensi, “Malthus Mysterious Orofacial Cleft Correction,” 
The Cleft Palate-Craniofacial Journal 55, no. 10 (2018), 1-2, 
https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1055665618760411. 
63 See also Mary Theresa Lewis, Extracts of the Journals and Correspondence of Miss Berry from the Year 
1783 to 1852 (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1865), 2:475: “I dined at Mrs. Apreece’s … I sat by 
Malthus, and had a good deal of conversation with him—interesting, when one gets over his painful 
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Never shy about voicing her opinions of her contemporaries in private correspondence,64 
Edgeworth wrote to her mother on January 23, 1822, that she wished Malthus’ “hair lip 
were away and that he could speak more like a human creature for if I were a child and 
had heard of his being an Ogre I should run away if he were to come near me and begin 
to speak.”65 Eight years later, she wrote again to her mother on November 2, noting that 
Malthus in “spite of all that Nature did to make his uncouth mouth and horrid voice 
forbid made us admire and love him … his kindness to me is beyond belief.”66 More 
interesting is the commentary of Martineau, who out of deafness resorted to using an ear 
trumpet in conversation.67 She noted that 
Of all the people in the world, Malthus was the one whom I heard quite easily 
without it;—Malthus, whose speech was hopelessly imperfect, from defect in the 
palate. I dreaded meeting him when invited by a friend of his who made my 
acquaintance on purpose. He had told this lady that he should be in town on such 
a day, and entreated her to get an introduction, and call and invite me; his reason 
being that whereas his friends had done him all manner of mischief by defending 
him injudiciously, my tales had represented his views precisely as he could have 
wished. I could not decline an invitation such as this: but when I considered my 
own deafness, and his inability to pronounce half the consonants in the alphabet, 
and his hare-lip which must prevent my offering him my tube, I feared we should 
make a terrible business of it. I was delightfully wrong. His first sentence,—slow 
and gentle, with the vowels sonorous, whatever might become of the 
 
manner of speaking from wanting a palate to his mouth, and having had a hair-lip—not, however, at all 
unpleasant in appearance.” 
64 For instance, Edgeworth wrote of Sismondi on September 26, 1820: “He is black and ugly and heavy in 
conversation but touch on certain historical subjects and he will talk like a book—like his own book. We all 
agree that we should be very sorry to be his wife. I know I should go to sleep some day when he was 
talking or waken some morning tired to death of him.” See Christina Colvin, ed., Maria Edgeworth in 
France and Switzerland: Selections from the Edgeworth family letters (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 
253. 
65 Maria Edgeworth, Letters from England, 1813-1844, ed. Christina Colvin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1971), 331. 
66 Ibid., 423-4. 
67 In a June 16, 1838 letter to Rachel Mordecai Lazarus, Edgeworth quipped that Martineau’s “mind is as 
deaf as her ear” regarding American politics. See Edgar E. MacDonald, ed., The Education of the Heart: 
The Correspondence of Rachel Mordecai Lazarus and Maria Edgeworth (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1977), 311. Cf. Edgeworth’s letter to Sophie Ruxton of July 29, 1837 on the same topic: 
“she has a most courageous mind and enthusiasm for good—But I cannot agree with her democratic mania 
and her notions of the rights of women.” See Valerie Pakenham, ed., Maria Edgeworth’s Letters from 
Ireland (Dublin: Lilliput Press, 2018), 367. 
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consonants,—set me at ease completely. I soon found that the vowels are in fact 
all that I ever hear. His worst letter was l: and when I had no difficulty with his 
question,—“Would not you like to have a look at the Lakes of Killarney?” I had 
nothing more to fear. It really gratified him that I heard him better than any body 
else; and whenever we met at dinner, I somehow found myself beside him, with 
my best ear next to him; and then I heard all he said to every body at table.68 
 
Malthus overcame his disability, becoming an Anglican priest and later a 
professor of history and political economy at East-India College, Hertfordshire.69 His 
Essay on Population propelled him to international celebrity, though it also made him the 
target of scorn. William Cobbett, for instance, described Malthus’ views as a “mixture of 
madness and of blasphemy” and the man himself as “the monster Malthus, who has 
furnished the unfeeling oligarchs and their toad-eaters with the pretence, that man has a 
natural propensity to breed faster than food can be raised for the increase.”70 This was 
not an inaccurate summary of Malthus’ main contention, but it in no way covers the 
breadth of his arguments. 
 
Malthus 
Malthus’ main argument in his Essay on the Principle of Population is that the natural 
rate of human reproduction always exceeds the growth of the means of subsistence.71 He 
illustrates this principle using data from British North America, according to which 
 
68 Maria Weston Chapman, ed. Harriet Martineau’s Autobiography (London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1877), 
1:327-8. 
69 See John Maynard Keynes, Essays in Biography, ed. Geoffrey Keynes (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1963), 81-124; and Patricia James, Population Malthus: His Life and Times (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1979). 
70 William Cobbett, Rural Rides (London: William Cobbett, 1830), 356. Emphasis original. 
71 Thomas Robert Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population: The 1803 Edition, ed. Shannon C. 
Stimson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 13. 
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population doubles every twenty-five years. From this, Malthus extrapolates that, when 
unconstrained by space and resources, population grows according to a geometrical (or 
exponential) ratio. Against this, he contrasts the arithmetical (or linear) growth of the 
means of subsistence. “Taking the whole earth … the human species would increase as 
the numbers 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, and subsistence as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. In 
two centuries the population would be to the means of subsistence as 256 to 9; in three 
centuries as 4096 to 13, and in two thousand years the difference would be almost 
incalculable.”72  
When expressed in this way, Malthus infused his argument with the rigor of 
mathematical certainty. But in so specifying the rates of increase of population and labor-
productivity, he opened himself up to a line of attack. Critic after critic sought to disprove 
Malthus’ ratios, conflating their a priori or a posteriori invalidation with a refutation of 
his contention that the full power of human reproduction cannot be permanently 
realized.73 Perhaps, as the economist James A. Field noted nearly a century ago, Malthus’ 
conspicuous placement of his ratios at the beginning of his argument had made them 
appear essential to its claim.74 But the ratios are specified only to be abandoned in the 
course of the Essay, demonstrating their superfluity to Malthus’ theory. Whatever the 
arbitrary values one assigns to the abstract potentialities of human reproduction and 
 
72 Ibid., 16. 
73 E.g. William Godwin, Of Population. An Enquiry Concerning the Powers of Increase in the Numbers of 
Mankind, Being an Answer to Mr. Malthus’s Essay on that Subject (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, 
and Brown, 1820). Cf. William Godwin, Thoughts Occasioned by the Perusal of Dr. Parr’s Spital Sermon, 
Preached at Christ Church, April 15, 1800: Being a Reply to the Attacks of Dr. Parr, Mr. Mackintosh, the 
Author of An Essay on Population, and Others (London: Taylor and Wilks, 1801), 54ff, esp. 57-9. 
74 James Alfred Field, Essays on Population and Other Papers, ed. Helen Fisher Hohman (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1931), 7-9. 
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agricultural productivity, natural checks to population and the difficulty of procuring 
subsistence prevent their realization. 
Malthus held that population is constantly subject to “preventative” and “positive” 
checks, both of which operate to keep the population down to the level of the means of 
subsistence. Preventative checks depress the birth-rate and can arise only from human 
action. Individuals rationally calculate the difficulties of raising a family and abstain from 
marriage. In the second edition of Malthus’ essay, this is referred to as “moral restraint.” 
Frustrated, the potential partners of these men engage in “promiscuous intercourse to 
such a degree as to prevent the birth of children.” This “degrade[s] the female character 
… destroy[ing] all its most amiable and distinguishing characteristics,” even as it 
corrupts men’s morals, weakens conjugal and parental bonds, and decreases the 
aggregate amount of happiness in society. Promiscuity is even more widespread among 
the poor in the cities, where “more real distress and aggravated misery” can be found than 
in any other context. Speaking in euphemisms, Malthus insists sexual “intrigues” abound 
in urban contexts, the concealment of which leads to “many other vices.”75 A significant 
yet frequently understated aspect of Malthus’ theory is the vice created by the practice of 
the preventative check. 
 In contrast to the preventative check, positive checks increase death-rates and 
have both anthropogenic and ecological causes. They include unhealthy occupations and 
excessive labor, exposure to the elements, extreme poverty, unhygienic living conditions, 
infanticide, insubstantial diet, war, disease, pestilence, famine, and plagues. In 
 
75 Malthus, 1803 Edition, 18-9. Compare Mandeville’s insistence that private vice leads to public virtue. 
See also Irwin Primer, ed., Bernard Mandeville’s “A Modest Defense of Public Stews”: Prostitution and Its 
Discontents in Early Georgian England (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
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Malthusian terminology, positive checks resolve into vice and misery, while the 
preventative check resolves into moral restraint and vice.76 
When population inevitably outstrips the means of subsistence, food prices rise 
and real wages fall. Most hardship is experienced by the vast majority of the laboring-
poor, who must work longer to maintain their standard of living. At this point, there are a 
number of escapes from the Malthusian cycle: if declining real wages cause a significant 
decrease in fertility-rates (that is, if enough individuals restrain from marriage); if 
cultivators sufficiently increase agricultural output (through increasing the number of 
employed laborers, expanding the total area under tillage, using higher-quality fertilizer, 
or by intensifying labor-processes); or if migration decreases population to a sufficient 
degree, then a balance between population and resources may be restored. In these cases, 
however, the process repeats itself until population absolutely outstrips the means of 
subsistence. This can result from a failure of the preventative check, from ecological 
constraints (such as soil-exhaustion) limiting agricultural production, from migration 
insufficient to reduce population, or any combination of these. Famine, crop failure, and 
widespread scarcities eventually shrink the population to a size able to be sustained by 
the available means of subsistence. The cycle then begins anew.77 
To escape these cyclical fluctuations of population, Malthus placed his faith in the 
vigorous practice of the preventative check in spite of its attendant vice. The benefits of 
its widespread adoption would accrue to couples who delay marriage, whose passions for 
one another would intensify in the absence of immediate gratification. Among the 
 
76 Malthus, 1803 Edition, 19-20. 
77 Ibid., 20-3. 
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working poor, such behavior would have the effect of increasing wages on account of the 
smaller supply of labor, and for society at large, warfare for territorial acquisition would 
be less frequent. Malthus even speculates that wars of aggression would disappear 
entirely from nations whose people universally adopt the preventative check.78 In light of 
this utopian belief it is hard not to view the inclusion of moral restraint in the second 
edition of Malthus’ Essay as a concession to the perfectibilists William Godwin and 
Marquis de Condorcet with whom he had so fervently disagreed in the first edition.79 
In their Population History of England, 1541-1871, the historical demographers 
E. A. Wrigley and R. S. Schofield confuted and corroborated certain aspects of Malthus’ 
theory. By reconstituting the demographic record from the 16th through 19th centuries, the 
two were able to compare oscillations in mortality and fertility with series of real wages 
and food prices. They came to a number of salient conclusions. The first was a validation 
of Malthus’ assertion that rising food prices are subsequent to population growth, 
although this relationship only applies to a pre-industrial economy. Moreover, Malthus’ 
contention that real wages were inversely related to the rate of population growth was 
also confirmed, as nominal wages varied little in the long term. The second conclusion 
was a rejection of Malthus’ claim that rising food prices engendered by demographic 
growth were followed by rising mortality. Though mortality responded to fluctuations in 
food prices before 1640, the relationship lessened in the following hundred years and 
there was no evidence of this positive check to population operating over the long term. 
 
78 Ibid., 381-96. 
79 Mark Blaug and George Stigler have also concluded that the inclusion of moral restraint was a 
concession, but for a different reason than mine. See Blaug, Ricardian Economics, 105; and George J. 
Stigler, “The Ricardian Theory of Value and Distribution,” Journal of Political Economy 60, no. 3 (June 
1952), 191, https://doi.org/10.1086/257208. 
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The third conclusion was a corroboration of Malthus’ insistence that the preventive check 
of delayed marriage operated to some extent throughout England. Wrigley and Schofield 
found nuptiality to respond positively to short-term fluctuations in real wages, while in 
the long term nuptiality’s behavior formed cycles which mimicked those of real wages, 
albeit with a lag of about 30 years.80  
Wrigley and Schofield’s reconstruction showed ample evidence of two features of 
Malthus’ theory: a population cycle operating via the preventative check and long-term 
oscillations of population and living standards. In the sixteenth century, increases of 
population were accompanied by rising food prices. In consequence of the high price of 
provisions, real wages fell, which saw individuals respond by curtailing nuptiality until 
rates of population growth turned negative in the mid-seventeenth century. Decreasing 
rates of population growth corresponded with falling food prices until real wages began 
to rise. Then nuptiality responded positively to the change in real wages. It began to rise 
in the late seventeenth century after falling for a hundred years, causing population 
growth to resume its increase. The cycle came to an end in the late eighteenth century, 
which was characterized by high rates of population growth, increasing food prices, 
falling real wages, and declining nuptiality.81 
Edgeworth, Marcet, and Martineau did not popularize Malthus’ principle of 
population through a distillation of the concept of population cycles. Instead they 
emphasized the positive checks following population outstripping the means of 
 
80 Roger S. Schofield, “Through a Glass Darkly: The Population History of England as an Experiment in 
History,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 15, no. 4 (Spring 1985), 587-8, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/204271; Wrigley and Schofield, Population History, 348-53, 359-84, 402-43, 466-
78. 
81 Schofield, “Glass,” 589; Wrigley and Schofield, Population History, 446-78. 
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subsistence. Though Wrigley and Schofield may have debunked the claim that positive 
checks follow rises in food prices, Edgeworth, Marcet, and Martineau cannot be faulted 
for adhering to an aspect of Malthus’ theory not yet proven incorrect in their day. Marcet 
and Martineau most likely placed emphasis on positive checks to make urgent the need to 
adhere to the preventative check. This was not the case with Edgeworth, who illustrated 
Malthus’ principle of population in terms of instinctually driven animals incapable of 
higher-order rational thought. 
 
Edgeworth 
With the exception of Henderson’s Economics as Literature, Edgeworth has been 
virtually nonexistent in histories of political economy.82 This is especially puzzling 
because she was the aunt of the economist Francis Ysidro Edgeworth and taught him how 
to read by the age of four.83 In his recollections, he remembered her as a “very plain old 
lady with a delightful face.”84 She was also an insightful observer of Malthus and 
Ricardo, whom she characterized in a posthumous memoir as a duo that “hunted together 
in search of Truth, and huzzaed when they first found her, without caring who found her 
first: indeed, I have seen them both put their able hands to the windlass to drag her up 
from the bottom of that well in which she so strangely delights to dwell.”85 Moreover, 
 
82 See Willie Henderson, Economics as Literature (New York: Routledge, 1995), 21-42. 
83 Lluís Barbé, Francis Ysidro Edgeworth: A Portrait with Family and Friends, trans. Mary C. Black 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010), 38. 
84 Quoted in Harriet Jessie Butler and Harold Edgeworth Butler, eds., The Black Book of Edgeworthstown 
and Other Edgeworth Memories 1585-1817 (London: Faber & Gwyer, 1927), 244. 
85 A Memoir of Maria Edgeworth, with a Selection from Her Letters. By the Late Mrs. Edgeworth. Edited 
by Her Children (London: n.p., 1867), 2:236. In this memoir, Edgeworth reveals a distaste for David 
Hume, whom she had met “at Mrs. Ricardo’s merely for ten minutes … Don’t like him much; attacks all 
things and persons, never listens, has no judgment.” See Memoir, 2:198. 
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Edgeworth and Ricardo were friendly enough to refer to each other as “cousins” in 
written correspondence.86 The cause of historiographical neglect cannot be obscurity 
because she was the most successful novelist in Britain from 1800 to 1814, outselling 
even Jane Austen.87 Despite the prevalence of political-economic themes throughout the 
entirety of Edgeworth’s work, scholarly interest in her has been primarily limited to her 
contributions to British literature. 
A significant portion of Edgeworth’s literary reputation rests upon her children’s 
stories, for which, according to Martineau, she received a great deal of respect. “It was as 
the friend of little children,” wrote Martineau, “that Miss Edgeworth is most beloved, and 
will be most gratefully remembered. Her delectable Rosamond is worth a score of famed 
novel-heroes, and is surely destined to everlasting youth, with an ingenuousness that can 
never be sullied, and a vivacity that can never be chilled.”88 It is fitting that Martineau, 
who had been described in the press as “a female Malthusian,”89 chose Rosamond out of 
all the possible works she could have named. Edgeworth’s vignette “The Rabbit,” 
starring Rosamond, is a fable stressing the necessity to maintain a balance between 
population and resources to prevent starvation. 
 
86 Sraffa, ed., Ricardo, 9:240, 274, 295. 
87 Note J. E. Austen-Leigh, A Memoir of Jane Austen and Other Family Recollections, ed. Kathryn 
Sutherland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 72: “I have made up my mind to like no novels really, 
but Miss Edgeworth’s, E.’s, and my own;” and Walter Scott, The Journal of Sir Walter Scott, 1825-32 
(Edinburgh: David Douglas, 1891), 164: “Edgeworth, Ferrier, Austen have all had their portraits of real 
society, far superior to anything man, vain man, has produced of the like nature.” 
88 Harriet Martineau, The History of England during the Thirty Years’ Peace: 1816-1846 (London: Charles 
Knight, 1849-50), 2:704. Cf. Harriet Martineau, Biographical Sketches (London: Macmillan and Co., 
1869), 389: “The grandmammas of our time, however, declare with warmth, as do many mothers and 
governesses, that Mrs. Marcet’s very best books are her ‘Stories for Very Little Children;’ and certainly, 
judging by observations of many little children, those small volumes do appear to be unique in their 
suitableness to the minds they were addressed to. Mrs. Barbauld’s ‘Early Lessons’ were good; Miss 
Edgeworth’s were better; but Mrs. Marcet’s are transcendent, as far as they go.” Emphasis mine. 
89 George Poulett Scrope, review of Illustrations of Political Economy, nos. 1-12, by Harriet Martineau, 
The Quarterly Review 49, no. 97 (1833), 151. Emphasis original. 
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 While in her garden, Rosamond discovers that a rabbit has eaten all but one of 
her laburnums. With the help of two other children, Orlando and Godfrey, Rosamond 
manages to trap the rabbit inside of a box. When the three debate what should be done 
with the rabbit, a conversation breaks out regarding the ethics of meat consumption. 
Rosamond decides she wishes to keep the rabbit as a pet and swears off eating meat to 
prevent the needless slaughter of animals. Orlando replies by posing a question: “How 
should we manage, if all sorts of animals become so numerous that there would not be 
food for them as us?”90 Orlando insists that animals would reproduce beyond the capacity 
of the garden to provide adequate subsistence. This alone convinces Rosamond to 
continue eating meat, but Edgeworth was not content to confine the moral there. She 
assumes a more authoritative voice by adopting the persona of Rosamond’s father. 
“Sheep and oxen do not eat men,” he insists, “but if they increased so much as to eat all 
the vegetables, they would in the end destroy men as effectually by starving them as if 
they eat them.”91 
Edgeworth asserts that the unchecked reproduction of animals poses an existential 
threat to humans, but the narrative is contradictory, and the children express reservations. 
Godfrey is intrigued enough to “think more of it, and write an essay on cruelty to 
animals”—no small feat for a child.92 Peering into the box, Rosamond is stricken with 
sympathy for the rabbit. “Poor fellow! … you think we are talking about you.” She asks 
for her father’s permission to release the rabbit “a great distance from our gardens, where 
he might live happily, and eat what he liked, without doing us any mischief.” He 
 
90 Maria Edgeworth, “Rosamond,” in Early Lessons (London: R. Hunter, 1815), 2:143. 
91 Ibid, 2:144. 
92 Ibid. 
31 
 
responds in the affirmative, pointing her to a heavily-populated rabbit-warren six miles 
away. He provides positive reinforcement through praise: “I am glad to see that you are 
so humane to this animal who has done you mischief.”93 They give the box to the farmer 
Early, who passes the rabbit-warren in the morning when traveling to market, in order to 
prevent the rabbit from eating any more laburnums.94 
In “The Rabbit,” Edgeworth tempers Malthus’ principle of population with a 
concern for animal wellbeing reminiscent of another British popularizer of economic 
ideas, Sarah Kirby Trimmer.95 (In itself a neglected topic amongst historians of economic 
thought, the cause of animal rights would later be championed by Jevons, who argued in 
The Fortnightly Review against recreational rabbit hunting on utilitarian grounds.96) But 
there are differences in the morals espoused by Trimmer and Edgeworth. In her Fabulous 
Histories, Trimmer argued that the “extraordinary increase” of certain species of animals 
“destined, by the Supreme Governor, as food for mankind … would be very injurious to 
us if” left unchecked. Humanity therefore has an “undoubted right to kill” these species, 
though “we should make their short lives as comfortable as possible.”97 Orlando’s 
argument against vegetarianism convinces Rosamond that humanity must continue to 
consume meat, but the act of releasing the rabbit into a population-dense habitat benign 
to the garden suggests human-beings can coexist peacefully with populous animals in 
 
93 Ibid., 2:145-6. 
94 Ibid., 2:152. 
95 See Mrs. Trimmer, Instructive Tales (London: J. Hatchard, 1810). 
96 William Stanley Jevons, “Cruelty to Animals—a Study in Sociology,” The Fortnightly Review 19 (1876), 
675. 
97 Mrs. Trimmer, Fabulous Histories (London: J. Johnson, 1786), 217-8. 
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such a way as to maximize agricultural production. At one and the same time, it is an act 
exemplifying kindness towards animals and concern for resources. 
Edgeworth’s decision to illustrate Malthus’ principle in terms of animality and 
horticulture deserves further consideration. Her choice of wildlife in a garden—rather 
than human-beings and agricultural production—is most likely indicative of the age of 
her audience.98 Expressed in this way, the story becomes palatable for young readers by 
eliminating all but the most essential of variables and expunging the darker aspects of 
Malthus’ theory. Yet the simplicity with which Edgeworth tells the tale also necessitates 
its contradictory narrative. Malthus argued that animals are instinctually impelled to 
reproduce and lack a preventative check akin to moral restraint.99 Without the twin 
virtues of prudence and foresight, Edgeworth can present no solution to the population 
problem and admits through Orlando and Godfrey the incompleteness of her illustration 
of Malthus’ theory. In the debate on reproduction, Orlando insists they have not “gone to 
the bottom of the business yet,” a sentiment with which Godfrey agrees.100 
 Thanks in part to the influence of many women writers, among whom Edgeworth 
was one, the public study of political economy became fashionable in England during the 
early nineteenth century. This popular interest in the subject lasted well after the end of 
the Napoleonic wars, as evidenced by Edgeworth’s March 9, 1822 letter from London to 
her paternal Aunt Margaret Ruxton. 
 
98 I cannot discount the fact that Edgeworth herself was a gardener. See Christina Colvin and Charles 
Nelson, “‘Building Castles of Flowers:’ Maria Edgeworth as Gardener,” Garden History 16, no. 1 (Spring 
1988), 58-70, https://doi.org/10.2307/1586905. 
99 Malthus, 1803 Edition, 12. 
100 Edgeworth, “Rosamond,” 2:144. 
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It has now become high fashion with blue ladies [educated women] to talk 
political economy. There is a certain Lady Mary Shepherd101 who makes a great 
jabbering on this subject while others who have more sense like Mrs. Marcet hold 
their tongues and listen. … Mean time fine ladies now require that their daughters 
[sic] governesses [tutors] should teach political economy. “Pray Ma’am” said a 
fine Mamma to one who came to offer herself as a governess “Do you teach 
political economy?” The governess who thought she had provided herself well 
with French Italian Music drawing dancing &c was quite astounded by this 
unexpected requisition[;] she hesitatingly answered “No, Ma’am, I cannot say I 
teach political economy, but I would if you think proper try to learn it.” “Oh dear 
no Ma’am. if you don’t teach it you wont [sic] do for me.”102 
 
An education in political economy at this time was thus considered the necessary 
complement to an education in domestic (or household) economy.103 In the words of 
James Mill, who noted the importance of the distinction on the first page of his 
elementary exposition of Ricardian theory, “Political economy is to the State, what 
domestic economy is to the family.”104 That women were unlikely to become legislators 
did not deter writers of Mill’s caliber from arming political economy’s importance for 
women. In middle- and upper-class families affluent enough to afford a governess, the 
 
101 Edgeworth’s children excised the identity of Mary Shepherd (1777-1847) from the version of the letter 
they included in Memoir, 2:180. Augustus J. C. Hare, ed., followed suit in The Life and Letters of Maria 
Edgeworth (London: Edward Arnold, 1894), 2:65. Shepherd was a respected metaphysician whose talents 
apparently did not extend into the realm of political economy. See Deborah Boyle, “Expanding the Canon 
of Scottish Philosophy: The Case for Adding Lady Mary Shepherd,” The Journal of Scottish Philosophy 
15, no. 3 (2017), 275-93, https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2017.0173. 
102 Edgeworth, Letters from England, 364. 
103 On domestic economy, see for example J. A. Stewart, The Young Woman’s Companion, 3rd ed. (Oxford: 
Bartlett and Newman, 1815); Anne Cobbett, The English Housekeeper (London: Anne Cobbett, 1835); 
Esther Copley, Cottage Comforts, 17th ed. (London: Simpkin and Marshall, 1841); Margaret Maria 
Brewster, Household Economy (London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co., 1858); and Harriet Martineau, Health, 
Husbandry, and Handicraft (London: Bradbury and Evans, 1861). Note the 1849 observations of Henry 
Crabb Robinson: “Miss Martineau makes herself an object of envy by the success of her domestic 
arrangements. She has built a cottage near her house, placed in it a Norfolk dairymaid, and has her poultry-
yard, and her piggery, and her cowshed; and Mrs. Wordsworth declares she is a model in her household 
economy, making her servants happy, and setting an example of activity to her neighbors.” See Thomas 
Sadler, ed., Diary, Reminiscences, and Correspondence of Henry Crabb Robinson, 3rd ed. (London: 
Macmillan and Co., 1872), 304. 
104 James Mill, Elements of Political Economy (London: Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 1821), 1. 
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subject became part of the education curriculum for young women as well as for men.105 
The material utilized most frequently by governesses to teach the subject was authored by 
another woman writer on political economy, to whom the author Lucy Aikin owed her 
learning on the subject, as expressed in a June 1817 letter from London. 
I have been reading a book on—what do you think? I would give you twenty 
guesses—a book by a lady, of which I said at first, with all the superciliousness of 
profound ignorance, ‘I shall not read it, I am sure.’ But, happening to peep 
between two of its unopened leaves, I cast my eyes on so wise and well-written an 
exposé of the inconveniences of this same ignorance in which I gloried, that I 
have found myself shamed into opening the leaves, studying it from end to end 
with great attention, and confessing that I found it well worth the pains—in short, 
I have been perusing Mrs. Marcet’s ‘Conversations on Political Economy.’106 
 
Marcet 
Jane Haldimand Marcet’s Conversations on Political Economy (1816) is a fictitious 
dialog between the governess Mrs. Bryant (Mrs. B.) and her pupil Caroline, the same two 
protagonists of her 1805 Conversations on Chemistry.107 In addition to population, 
 
105 Virginia Woolf wrote an insightful biographical essay on the daughter of Sarah Kirby Trimmer, Selina, 
who was a governess to Lady Harriet Leveson-Gower. See Virginia Woolf, “Hary-o: The Letters of Lady 
Harriet Cavendish,” in The Essays of Virginia Woolf, ed. Stuart N. Clarke (London: The Hogarth Press, 
2011), 6:229-35. Woolf cites Instructive Tales when pressed to name a work of the elder Trimmer familiar 
to the reader. Given that her most well-known work was actually Fabulous Histories, this suggests that 
Alfred Marshall’s decision to place Trimmer alongside Marcet and Martineau (see below) was not 
misplaced. For more on governesses, see Martineau, Health, 188-201. 
106 Philip Hemery Le Breton, ed., Memoirs, Miscellanies and Letters of the Late Lucy Aikin (London: 
Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, & Green, 1864), 107-8. Aikin found Marcet’s brother impressive 
when the two dined together two years later: “I had on my other side at dinner a much more prepossessing 
person, Mr. Haldimand, Mrs. Marcet’s brother, who is not a little proud apparently of such a sister. I 
suppose he is one of the ablest and most enlightened mercantile men in London, and learnedly talked he of 
usury laws and so forth; observing that ladies now studied political economy, on the whole I found him 
polished, clever, and entertaining.” See Le Breton, ed., Lucy Aikin, 118. Emphasis mine. 
107 Of note is Mary Somerville’s comments, which relate the fact that Marcet’s Conversations on Chemistry 
convinced Michael Faraday to become a scientist: “So many books have now been published for young 
people, that no one at this time can duly estimate the importance of Mrs. Marcet’s scientific works. To 
them is partly owing the higher intellectual education now beginning to prevail among the better classes in 
Britain. They produced a great sensation, and went through many editions. Her ‘Conversations on 
Chemistry,’ first opened out to Faraday’s mind that field of science in which he became so illustrious, and 
at the height of his fame he always mentioned Mrs. Marcet with deep reverence.” See Martha Somerville, 
ed., Personal Recollections from Early Life to Old Age of Mary Somerville (London: John Murray, 1874), 
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Marcet’s Conversations on Political Economy covers property, the division of labor, 
capital, wages, poverty, revenue, value and price, currency, commerce, foreign trade, and 
state expenditure. It was an immediate success upon its publication, which led to remarks 
like those of Anne Garbett Romilly to Maria Edgeworth of December 17, 1816. 
Have you not been delighted with Mrs. Marcet? What an extraordinary work for a 
woman! Everybody who understands the subject is in a state of astonishment, and 
those, who like me know very little or nothing about it, are delighted with the 
knowledge they have acquired. One of our çi-devant Judges, Sir James Mansfield, 
who is in his 83rd year devours all that is new in Literature, is charmed and 
laments extremely that he did not know as much as that Book has taught him 
when he was at the Bar. What a blessing for the country is our twelve Judges, to 
say nothing of Ministers, did but know one half which is contained in it. A 
tolerably bold opinion you may think I have hazarded here but in your ear I may 
whisper it is not my own.108 
 
Romilly’s comments are confirmed by the reception of Conversations on Political 
Economy in the press. It was released to universal acclaim.109 Before Romilly’s 
comments, lavish praise flowed from the pen of Leonard Horner, a merchant and younger 
brother of the politician Francis Horner, who shared his thoughts with Jane’s husband 
Alexander in a letter of October 1, 1816. 
I have read the “Conversations on Political Economy” with very great 
satisfaction. Mrs. Marcet has executed a difficult task with great skill, and has 
made the subject not only very accessible to ordinary readers, but at the same time 
very interesting. She has discovered a royal road to political economy, and I am 
sure it is a book which will do an infinite deal of good, by removing many 
 
114. Note also Maria Edgeworth’s letter to Fanny Edgeworth of May 18, 1813: “Mrs. Marcet said that she 
was quite surprised by my father’s having ventured to give ‘Conversations on Chemistry’ to a girl of 9 
years old. My mother told how it had been read and explained bit by bit. ‘Ah’ said Mrs. Marcet ‘Who but 
Mr. E would or could do that!” See Edgeworth, Letters from England, 64. 
108 Samuel Henry Romilly, ed., Romilly-Edgeworth Letters: 1813-1818 (London: John Murray, 1936), 160. 
109 See Unsigned review of Conversations on Political Economy, by Jane Haldimand Marcet, The Eclectic 
Review 6 (September 1816), 288-90; Unsigned review of Conversations on Political Economy, by Jane 
Haldimand Marcet, The London Review 70 (September 1816), 250-2; Unsigned review of Conversations on 
Political Economy, by Jane Haldimand Marcet, The Gentleman’s Magazine (November 1816), 441; and 
Unsigned review of Conversations on Political Economy, by Jane Haldimand Marcet, The Monthly Review 
83 (May 1817), 106-7. 
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popular prejudices, which are very deep rooted. Mr. W. Haldimand cannot do a 
greater service to his country than by getting each of his brother directors to study 
this treatise; and if Prévost can effect the same purpose at Lloyd’s, it will change 
the whole character of the merchants of London, which I suppose never stood 
more in need of improvement. 
 Mrs. Horner desires me to say, that with very few exceptions, it is quite 
level to the capacities of the ladies, and that even these passages only require a 
little borrowed light, to appear quite distinct. She unites with me in kindest 
regards to Mrs. Marcet, to yourself, and all your family circle.110 
 
The work impressed Horner enough to make it a point of discussion with the Ricardian 
political economist John Ramsay McCulloch, whose comments add weight to the 
acclaimed reception of others. To Marcet’s husband, Horner wrote on May 22, 1819, 
I have been speaking to McCulloch about the “Conversations on Political 
Economy,” and telling him how much good he would do, by making this 
excellent work more extensively known. When I asked him if he knew it, he said 
“Know it? Why there it is on my table before me—I have read it three times 
regularly through, and am constantly referring to it. It contains all the soundest 
and most enlightened views, most clearly laid down.” He said he should certainly 
consider whether he could make a review of it to satisfy himself.111 
 
Unfortunately, McCulloch never wrote the review, a fact to which Horner’s April 10, 
1821 comments attest.112 McCulloch did, however, paint the book in an immensely 
positive light when it was brought up in conversation at a dinner party. According to 
Horner, he “at last fairly acknowledged that he had begun a review, and found he could 
not do the book justice. He added, however, before a pretty numerous party, that ‘it is the 
best book on the subject without any exception,’ these were his words.”113  
 
110 Katharine M. Lyell, ed., Memoir of Leonard Horner (London: Women’s Printing Society, 1890), 1:98-9. 
111 Ibid., 1:158-9. 
112 Ibid., 1:192. 
113 Ibid. McCulloch eventually gave the work public attention twenty-four years later, writing: “This is on 
the whole, perhaps, the best introduction to the science that has yet appeared.” See J. R. McCulloch, The 
Literature of Political Economy (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1845), 18 
37 
 
McCulloch’s comments were not anomalous amongst political economists. Say 
was moved enough by Marcet’s Conversations to write her on September 4, 1816 with 
his thoughts even before he had finished the book. 
You have given me the greatest pleasure, and this pleasure is by no means at an 
end; I have begun to read your work and still haven’t finished it. You have 
worked much more efficiently than I to popularize and spread extremely useful 
ideas; and you will succeed, Madam, since you have built on the strength of 
science, those graces which could even cause errors to be overlooked … It is not 
possible to stay closer to the truth with more charm; to clothe such indisputable 
principles with a more elegant style. I am an old soldier who asks only to die in 
your light.114 
 
Marcet’s book was successful enough for the English translator of Say’s Treatise on 
Political Economy to observe in 1821—the same year of the Conversations’ fourth 
edition (out of seven)115 and of the appearance of a knock-off by the protectionist Joseph 
Pinsent116—that it had “become an inmate of most establishments for the better classes of 
instruction.”117 This meant that an entire generation was exposed to a graphic exposition 
of Malthus’ principle stressing that uncontrolled population growth results in abject 
misery. 
Marcet’s fictitious pupil Caroline often expresses views which the reader 
discovers to be erroneous, and this is how the treatment of population begins. Caroline 
expresses a conception of population not dissimilar to the traditional Cameralist 
 
114 Bette Polkinghorn, “A Communication: An Unpublished Letter of J.B. Say,” Eastern Economic Journal 
11, no. 2 (April-June 1985), 170, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40324974. 
115 [Jane Haldimand Marcet,] Conversations on Political Economy; In Which the Elements of that Science 
are Familiarly Explained, 4th ed. (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1821); Mrs. Marcet, 
Conversations on Political Economy; In Which the Elements of that Science are Familiarly Explained, 7th 
ed. (London: Longman, Orme, Brown, Green, & Longmans, 1839). 
116 See Joseph Pinsent, Conversations on Political Economy (London: J. M. Richardson, 1821). 
117 Jean Baptiste-Say, A Treatise on Political Economy; or the Production, Distribution, and Consumption 
of Wealth, trans. C. R. Prinsep (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1821), 1:v. 
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understanding of demographic growth as an intrinsically healthy phenomenon 
representative of national prosperity.118 She declares that she “always thought that it was 
very desirable to have a great population. All rich thriving countries are populous: great 
cities are populous; wealth … encourages population; and population in turn promotes 
wealth, for labourers produce more than they consume.”119 Mrs. B.’s method is to gently 
guide Caroline to the truth, so she grants that this is the case in young nations like the 
United States where the availability of “capital”—a term she uses as shorthand for the 
“means of subsistence”— encourages early marriages.120 In such places the increase of 
capital easily keeps pace with population growth, and so children are “well fed, thriving, 
and healthy.”121 Tacitly relying upon Malthus’ calculation, Mrs. B. asserts that the 
American population doubles itself in only 23 years.122 But the situation is far different in 
older nations like England, where the rate of population growth has exceeded the increase 
of capital. There the wages of labor have fallen and the poor have become miserable.123 
To prevent population from outstripping capital, Marcet prescribes behavior on the 
individual level: one ought not to marry unless one’s income will support offspring.124 
Marcet betrays her instructive intent by phrasing Malthus’ principle in a 
normative declaration. Yet she is not content to stop there. She cements the lesson in the 
reader’s mind by illustrating the consequences of unchecked demographic growth. If a 
nation’s capital is insufficient to provide for its population, scarcity causes a rise in the 
 
118 [Marcet,] Conversations, 2. 
119 Ibid., 140. 
120 Ibid., 138. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid., 139. 
124 Ibid., 123. 
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price of provisions simultaneous as a rise in the number of laborers causes real wages to 
fall.125 Families must subsist on less and less. Want of proper nourishment leaves 
individuals susceptible to diseases like smallpox and measles.126 Infants are the first to 
perish. They “are born merely to languish a few years in poverty, and to fall early victims 
to disease brought on by want and wretchedness.” They “weaken, impoverish, and 
render” the nation ever the more miserable. They “consume without reproducing, they 
suffer without enjoying, and they give pain and sorrow to their parents without ever 
reaching that age when they might reward their paternal cares.” Such “is the fate of 
thousands of children wherever population exceeds the means of subsistence.”127 
For Caroline, this is a distressing revelation. But it makes the distress of the poor 
comprehensible. They are the agents of their own destruction through lack of “prudence 
and foresight.”128 No amelioration of their condition can be permanent unless they curtail 
their fertility according to their ability to provide for their offspring. Hence Mrs. B. 
insists to Caroline that 
Were all men as considerate as your gardener, Thomas, and did they not marry till 
they had secured a provision for a family, or could earn a sufficiency to maintain 
it; in short, were children not brought into the world until there was bread to feed 
them, the distress which you have just been describing would be unknown, 
excepting in cases of unforeseen misfortunes, or unless produced by idleness or 
vice.129 
 
The reality of unchecked population growth may be dismal, the solution to the problem, 
writes Marcet, is Malthus’ preventative check of moral restraint. She did the same in 
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John Hopkins’s Notions on Political Economy (1833), a collection of short stories 
targeted at the working classes which Malthus thought was “better suited” for that 
purpose “than Miss Martineau’s Tales which are justly so much admired.”130 Laborers 
unable to provide for their excessively large families cannot retroactively postpone 
marriage and childbirth, but they can teach their children Malthus’ lessons to prevent 
them from experiencing the same fate.131 
Marcet exerted considerable influence over Harriet Martineau, who read her 
Conversations on Political Economy in 1827 at the age of 25. In her autobiography, 
Martineau explained that she read the book “chiefly to see what Political Economy 
precisely was.”132 By reading Marcet’s dialog, it immediately struck her that “the 
principles of the whole science might be advantageously conveyed in the same way … by 
being exhibited in their natural workings in selected passages of social life.”133 After she 
achieved a modicum of success, Martineau wrote Marcet from Norwich on October 11, 
1832 to thank her. 
Your Conversations on Political Economy first gave solidarity and form to the 
floating ideas on the subject which I had gathered from newspapers, and to you 
therefore I feel much of the success of my present exertions is owing. I read your 
work again and again with delight during the first year after it was put into my 
hands; and it confirmed a purpose which I had before conceived of acquainting 
the common people with certain facts of the social system which they do 
themselves great mischief by misunderstanding … I thought of nothing beyond 
 
130 Bette A. Polkinghorn, “An Unpublished Letter from Malthus to Jane Marcet, January 22, 1833,” The 
American Economic Review 76, no. 4 (September 1986), 845, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1806082. 
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Machinery and Wages, on which I had written two little tales134 actually before I 
knew that their doctrine appertained to the Science of Political Economy.135 
 
It is thus to Jane Haldimand Marcet, a woman so frequently absent or marginalized in 
canonical histories of economic thought, that the inception of Martineau’s Illustrations of 
Political Economy can be traced. 
 
Martineau 
Martineau described her mission “in illustrating Political Economy, to exemplify 
Malthus’s doctrine [foremost] among the rest.”136 She therefore touches upon Malthusian 
themes in many of her Illustrations such as “A Manchester Strike,” wherein Martineau 
has young laborers marry when their incomes are in a precarious state during the strike 
and suggests that to do so is thoughtless and imprudent.137 The most Malthusian of all her 
Illustrations, however, is “Weal and Woe in Garveloch”—a blaring warning of the 
dangers of human reproduction when unchecked by moral restraint. 
Public memory on the island of Garveloch holds nothing but economic prosperity, 
and the population has multiplied fruitfully over generations. The assumption reigns 
strong among many that prosperity has no end. It does not occur to anyone to accumulate 
a stock of capital in case of economic distress.138 Martineau gives voice to reason through 
 
134 See Harriet Martineau, The Rioters (Wellington, Salop: Houlston and Son, 1827); and Harriet 
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her characters Angus and Ella. Ella expresses anxiety over the carrying capacity of 
Garveloch’s soil, a fear which Angus validates by citing Malthus’ geometric ratio. As 
“the number of people doubles itself [exponentially] for ever, while the produce of the 
land does not, the people must increase faster than produce.”139 With Marcet, Martineau 
takes “capital” to be shorthand for “the means of subsistence” and argues that it cannot 
match population’s rate of increase. Population proceeds according to the progression 
“one to two, four, eight, sixteen, thirty-two, sixty-four,” and therefore increases 
exponentially over time.140 Yet for all her adherence to Malthus’ geometric ratio, 
Martineau discards his arithmetical ratio by adopting the law of diminishing returns.141 
She asserts that “produce will fall behind more and more, as every improvement, every 
outlay of capital yields a less return.”142 What Martineau is really contrasting here is the 
apriori proposition that population growth follows an exponential curve with the 
empirical observation that returns on capital diminish with successive inputs. It is a 
comparison of apples and oranges. In contrast, when Malthus set the geometric increase 
of population against the arithmetic growth of agricultural produce—agriculture 
following a linear curve with static returns—he had been comparing like with like in the 
sense of two abstract rates of increase without reference to experience. 
Despite this point of contention, Malthus and Martineau’s conclusions are the 
same: “since capital increases in a slower ratio than population, there will be sooner or 
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later a deficiency of food.”143 She illustrates this over the course of the narrative, where 
unchecked population growth in Garveloch nearly dissolves the community. Real wages 
fall as the price of provisions rises in proportion to scarcity.144 Economic distress causes 
an increase in crime, violence, and infant mortality.145 The fault lies squarely with 
Garveloch’s inhabitants, who, like children that feed fish to dogs during a period of 
famine, “did not perceive that … it was their fault that the number of eaters was 
needlessly increased.”146 Martineau makes her instructive intent explicit by stressing that 
the “half-starved multitudes of an over-populated kingdom might take a lesson from their 
folly.”147 
The solution to the population problem is similar to that of Malthus. Martineau 
argues that “prudence and foresight” resulting in the delay of marriage or restraint from 
further reproductive activity is the only solution to curb population growth.148 Individuals 
must rationally forecast their economic futures and modify their behavior accordingly. 
Martineau insists that individuals who do not adhere to the preventative check of moral 
restraint should not “repine if harsher checks follow. If the passionate man … 
imprudently indulges in his love, he must not complain when poverty, disease, and death 
lay waste his family.”149  
Here Martineau relies upon the individual male as her actor, as did Marcet and 
Malthus, but in her view women are just as able as their male counterparts to rationally 
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calculate their circumstances and curtail their fertility. Martineau argues that a woman’s 
concern for her male partner and her children makes her “peculiarly qualified for seeing 
the truth when fairly placed before” her. She is just as able to conclude, “after calculating 
numbers and resources, that there must be some check to the increase of the people, and 
that the prudential check [of abstinence] is infinitely preferable to those of vice and 
misery.”150 
Like Marcet, Martineau expects individuals with excessively large families to 
inculcate their children with the virtues of prudence and foresight to prevent the 
perpetuation of poverty. This is the moral of her novel “A Manchester Strike,” wherein 
impoverished laborers are told they must discourage their children from having 
imprudent and early marriages to alleviate economic distress.151 Small steps may be taken 
in the present by saving stocks of capital or establishing mutual savings banks for relief, 
but in the final analysis the amelioration of poverty is a future occurrence dependent upon 
adherence to the preventative check. 
Critical reviewers of Martineau’s Illustrations were revolted by her 
discouragement of marriage. They saw it as an affront to the social order. The political 
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economist and opponent of Malthus George Poulett Scrope152 could hardly believe the 
existence of “a female Malthusian. A woman who thinks child-bearing is a crime against 
society! An unmarried woman who declaims against marriage!! A young woman who 
deprecates charity and a provision for the poor!!!”153 It was the same with the journalist 
William Maginn: “a book written by a woman against the poor—a book written by a 
young woman against marriage!”154 These reviewers let their tempers cloud their 
judgment, forgetting that Martineau discouraged marriage only when the resultant 
offspring could not be adequately provided for. Martineau’s discouragement of marriage 
was conditional, not absolute. 
Martineau recognized while writing “Weal and Woe” that its message could be 
misconstrued and therefore ruinous to her reputation. In her autobiography, she admits 
that she “risked much in writing and publishing on a subject which was not universally 
treated in the pure, benevolent, and scientific spirit of Malthus himself … While writing 
‘Weal and Woe in Garveloch,’ the perspiration many a time streamed down my face.” 
But she truly believed in its message, arguing that “there was not a line in it which might 
not be read aloud in any family.” When she finished the work, she looked to the women 
in her life for guidance. She 
read it aloud to my mother and my aunt. If there had been any opening whatever 
for doubt or dread, I was sure that these two ladies would have given me abundant 
warning and exhortation,—both from their very keen sense of propriety and their 
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anxious affection for me. But they were as complacent and easy as they had been 
interested and attentive. I saw that all ought to be safe.155 
 
But all was not safe. According to Martineau, Scrope’s review did serious damage to her 
reputation. For a decade after its publication she was the frequent target of insult and 
mockery.156 Potential readers became wary of Martineau solely on reputation. She shared 
this fate with Malthus, whom she described as  
the ‘best-abused man’ of the age. I was aware of this; and I saw in him, when I 
afterwards knew him, one of the serenest and most cheerful men that society can 
produce … I asked Mr. Malthus one day whether he had suffered in spirits from 
the abuse lavished on him. ‘Only just at first,’ he answered.—‘I wonder whether it 
ever kept you awake a minute.’—‘Never after the first fortnite,’ was his reply. 
The spectacle of the good man in his daily life, in contrast with the 
representations of him in the periodical literature of the time, impressed upon me, 
more forcibly than any thing in my own experience, the everlasting fact that the 
reformers of morality, person and social, are always subject at the outset to the 
imputation of immorality from those interested in the continuance of 
corruption.—I need only add that all suspicious speculation, in regard to my 
social doctrines, seems to have died out long ago.157 
 
Actual readers found nothing immoral in Martineau’s novels. Martineau provides 
the example of one woman who expressed reservations at seeing her books sitting on a 
table within the reach of children, as they had been deemed improper books by Scrope in 
the Quarterly Review. After reading “Weal and Woe” at the behest of a friend, this 
woman could not imagine that it could be the same book described by Scrope. She found 
it so benign that she allowed her husband to read it aloud to adolescents. In fact, they read 
all of the installments of Martineau’s Illustrations of Political Economy and never found 
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the novellas improper.158 Martineau achieved international celebrity in spite of the attacks 
by Scrope and his ilk. Actually reading “Weal and Woe” put to rest fears of immorality. 
Martineau’s didactic exposition of Malthus principle of population was circulated 
widely throughout Britain, the United States, and continental Europe. It was even used as 
educational material by national governments. She reveals this in her autobiography in an 
1833 encounter with Jane Haldimand Marcet. 
Among the very first of my visitors at my lodgings was Mrs. Marcet … Her great 
pleasure in regard to me was to climb the two flights of stairs at my lodging 
(asthma notwithstanding) to tell me … that the then new and popular sovereign, 
Louis Philippe, had ordered a copy of my Series for each member of his family, 
and had desired M. Guizot to introduce a translation of it into the national schools 
… About the same time, I heard … that the Emperor of Russia had ordered a copy 
of my Series for every member of his family; and … that a great number of copies 
had been bought, by the Czar’s order, for his schools in Russia.159 
 
That Martineau is not taken seriously by many historians of political economy is 
especially confounding considering the international popularity of her works and the 
sheer numbers of school children who must have been exposed to her writings. The cause 
of this neglect can be traced back to Alfred Marshall, who frequently singled out 
Martineau throughout his career and tarnished her reputation amongst economists.160 
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Marshall 
For Marshall, Martineau embodied everything wrong with political economy: her 
didacticism, her use of fiction, and her insistence upon the agency of women.161 That she 
became an international celebrity through popularizing economic ideas made her 
unacceptable to Marshall. In his Principles of Economics, he cited her as the premier 
example of the “hangers on and parasites” who, while “professing to simplify economic 
doctrines, really enunciated them without the conditions required to make them true.”162 
Marshall does not say what these “conditions” are and leaves the reader to turn his 
assertion into an argument. This appears to be a post hoc rational, because Marshall’s 
other writings suggest his hatred of Martineau stems from a different source. 
That Martineau was a woman was likely the cause of Marshall’s scorn. For 
Marshall, economics “is like a fine chest of tools, which will not turn out anything of 
value except in skilled hands. This indicates that economics is a subject generally 
unsuited for advance by women.”163 Rather, women’s talents are suited to “minor 
inquiries” such as: “(a) abundance of leisure; (b) interest in the concrete; (c) interest in 
personal matters; (d) sympathies; (e) access to the Unimportant individually, but 
numerous and therefore important collectively; (f) power of pursuing certain delicate 
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inquiries related to women and children in which a man would be out of his element.”164 
Nowhere in his list does Marshall provide a role for women in intellectual life. In contrast 
to his earlier advocacy of women’s education at Cambridge while under the influence of 
Henry Sedgwick,165 Marshall, as the economist John Maynard Keynes noted, “came 
increasingly to the conclusion that there was nothing useful to be made of women’s 
intellects.”166 As Marshall wrote to the Cambridge University Senate on February 3, 
1896, a woman who pursues academics rather than “household management either as a 
wife or sister” might “get her honours; but her true life is impoverished and not enriched 
by them.”167 
Having been produced by a woman in contradiction to all six of his proposed 
“minor inquiries,” Martineau’s Illustrations were in Marshall’s mind nothing more than 
an exercise in folly. He saved his harshest criticism of her for his final 1908 lecture at 
Cambridge: “Miss Martineau who only said one good thing in her life and that was just 
before she died ‘that probably everything she had said about Economics was wrong.’”168 
At the time of this lecture three quarters of a century had passed since the publication of 
Martineau’s Illustrations. Marshall’s statement attests to the work’s enduring relevance 
and to the extent of his rage. Yet I cannot but conclude that Marshall’s quotation is most 
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likely fabricated. It is nowhere to be found in Martineau’s autobiography, in her other 
published works, or in any of her letters,169 and Marshall himself provides no reference. I 
am only able to trace it back to the first edition of Marshall’s Principles, where he 
asserted without citation that before her death Martineau confessed a “‘suspicion that 
economic doctrines might be all wrong.’”170 Possibly due to criticism, Marshall expunged 
the footnote attacking Martineau in the second edition.171 But he restored it—albeit it 
without Martineau’s identity and with somewhat tempered language—in the third and 
fourth.172 He then reinserted her into the footnote in the fifth edition.173 From the fifth 
through the final eighth edition, Marshall’s claim that Martineau retracted her views on 
political economy remained, though he now provided no direct quotation: “before her 
death she expressed a just doubt whether the principles of economics (as understood by 
her) had any validity.”174 This assertion has been reprinted as recently as 2013 without 
clarification explaining its dubious origin.175 It is likely that Marshall’s readers believe it 
to be true. Martineau rolls in her grave. 
The most significant of Marshall’s attacks relied on no invented evidence. Instead 
it was a repudiation of classical political economy for giving women a role in 
disseminating knowledge to popular audiences. He delivered this attack in an address to 
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the Cambridge Economic Club on October 29, 1896, and subsequently published it in 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics where it was circulated widely. 
Never again will a Mrs. Trimmer, a Mrs. Marcet, or a Miss Martineau earn a 
goodly reputation by throwing [general economic principles] into the form of a 
catechism or of simple tales, by aid of which any intelligent governess might 
make clear to the children nestling around her where lies economic truth, and 
might send them forth ready to instruct statesmen and merchants how to choose 
the right path in economic policy, and to avoid the wrong.176 
 
This was as much an affirmation of fact as a plea for the future, because Marshallian 
orthodoxy had by this time permeated the academy and professionalized the discipline. 
The economist in the Marshallian paradigm was a man trained a specialized body of 
knowledge inaccessible to the laity.177 Concern for practical problems such as keeping 
the increase of population from outpacing the growth of the means of subsistence was 
considered of lesser import than the acquisition of “knowledge for its own sake.”178 
Marshall’s address was reprinted in Pigou’s widely read Memorials of Alfred 
Marshall (1925),179 whose contributors included Keynes and Francis Ysidro Edgeworth 
among other influential voices. Keynes himself cited the passage attacking Trimmer, 
Marcet, and Martineau approvingly—an act in which no small part cemented its enduring 
impact.180  
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These actions combined with Marshall’s influence proved powerful enough to 
sully Martineau’s reputation amongst the economists of the day to enable such a 
consensus to persist into the present. The politician and economist Luigi Einaudi noted in 
1934 that Martineau was not a celebrated economic thinker as she was in her own 
time;181 and in 2001 the economist David M. Levy was “at a loss to explain why modern 
economists do not take Martineau seriously.”182 The fault lies with Alfred Marshall, and 
the consequences have been so far reaching as to mostly erase women like Martineau, 
Marcet, and Edgeworth from our canonical histories. It is high past time for historians of 
economic thought to discard the Marshallian framework that marginalizes women in their 
works. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued women distilled Malthus’ principle of population into didactic 
literature intended to ameliorate the behavior of their audience. Edgeworth illustrated 
Malthus’ principle of population in a children’s story warning that the unchecked 
reproduction of animals would cause humanity to experience a mortality crisis. Her moral 
was somewhat contradictory but suggested that humans must take care to shield their 
produce from fast-reproducing animals. Marcet utilized the medium of the dialog and the 
short story, instructing her adolescent and adult readers to delay marriage until they had 
secured resources enough to support a family. Otherwise, harsh checks to population such 
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as infant mortality would follow imprudent reproduction. Martineau’s exposition of 
Malthus’ principle in a novel for adults was the most complex of the three, but it held the 
same conclusions as Marcet: the discouragement of reproduction until one has obtained 
adequate resources to support their offspring. If the preventative check is not adhered to, 
more severe checks like disease and starvation will follow. In spite of the success of 
women popularizers, Marshall took pains to delegitimize their work to remove the 
presence of women from economics. Regretfully, his endeavors were successful, as the 
production of political economy in the form of didactic literature ceased with the 
establishment of Marshallian orthodoxy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
III.  POOR LAWS 
The English Poor Laws were the foremost policies Malthus critiqued according to 
his principle of population. Inaugurated by the Poor Relief Act of 1601, the Poor Laws 
relieved, according to the economic historian George Boyer, “the elderly, widows, 
children, the sick, the disabled, and the unemployed and underemployed.”183 Combining 
elements of family allowances, public works, unemployment compensation, and wage-
escalation, they have been described by the economist Mark Blaug as “a welfare state in 
miniature.”184 Malthus was one of the Poor Laws sternest critics and in his Essay on the 
Principle of Population advocated for their complete abolition. This chapter assesses to 
what degree women political economists—namely, Marcet and Martineau—circulated 
Malthusian ideas regarding the Poor Laws amongst the reading public. Following the 
pair’s close adherence to Malthus’ principle of population and the popular perception of 
Malthus as being a steadfast abolitionist regarding the Poor Laws, it might be expected 
for this chapter to argue that Marcet and Martineau circulated Malthusian views on the 
Poor Laws to mobilize support for their abolition. To a certain extent this hypothesis 
holds weight; Marcet and Martineau indeed did call for the abolition of the Poor Laws on 
what can be construed as Malthusian grounds in certain places. 
Rather than strictly following Malthus, however, Marcet and Martineau utilized 
original arguments to critique the Poor Laws. Furthermore, the two dissented from the 
abolitionist stance by advocating for measures called for by the 1832 Royal Commission 
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into the Operation of the Poor Laws and enacted through the 1834 Poor Law Amendment 
Act (also known as the New Poor Law). Though their original arguments do not find 
corollaries in Malthus’ thought, Marcet and Martineau’s support of reform is in concert 
with the (little-known) stance taken by Malthus in 1824 and 1830 according to which he 
held that reformed Poor Laws would be a net benefit to English society. It is, however, 
very doubtful that Marcet and Martineau were inspired by Malthus to champion the cause 
of reform. Marcet’s support of reform came in response to the New Poor Law, on which 
Malthus remained silent. Martineau generated her opinion on reform independent of 
Malthus, though she was probably influenced by the political economist and Poor Law 
Commissioner Nassau William Senior. The situation was evidently more complicated 
than the simple popularization of Malthus’ ideas, even if the two women had been 
influenced by the elder political economist in their considerations of his theory of 
population. 
Marcet and Martineau’s writings on the Poor Laws demonstrate that women 
political economists were more than popularizers in regard to this economic policy. 
While relying upon Malthus’s arguments to establish their criticisms of the Poor Laws, 
they also critiqued the laws on other grounds and supported reforms discordant with 
Malthus’ most well-known position. These substantial differences with Malthus lead one 
to the conclusion that, on the subject of the Poor Laws, women political economists were 
producers of political-economic knowledge in addition to circulators of knowledge 
attributable to their predecessors. 
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Malthus 
According to his earlier stance, Malthus saw no redeeming factors in the Poor Laws and 
advocated for their total abolition. In his words, it “will scarcely admit of a doubt, that if 
the poor laws had never existed in this country … the aggregate mass of happiness 
among the common people would have been much greater than it is at present.”185 And: 
“It may be asserted, without danger of exaggeration, that the poor laws have destroyed 
many more lives than they have preserved.”186 
Malthus argued that the Poor Laws worsened the condition of the poor in two 
ways. First, the Poor Laws stimulated population growth without increasing the means of 
subsistence. Second, the Poor Laws impoverished individuals not receiving poor relief, 
and thereby create more dependent poor.187 Regarding the first argument, Malthus 
contended that poor bachelors were able to marry without the prospect of maintaining a 
family because of the promise of poor relief. Due to the increased population resultant 
from improvident marriages, the provisions of the nation must be distributed in smaller 
shares. Consequently, more members of society are driven to the parish for relief, as they 
find themselves unable to suffice on the decreasing amount of food their labor 
commands.188  
 This argument is not without its complications; it becomes incoherent when one 
considers arguments made by Malthus in other places. He tempered his view that the 
Poor Laws encouraged improvident marriages in his public letter to Samuel Whitbread 
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(1807). There he maintained that “the poor laws do not encourage early marriages so 
much as might be expected” when one considers that the proportion of births and 
marriages to the whole English population is less than in most other European 
countries.189 He finally nullified the argument in the sixth edition of his Essay (1826), 
stating in an appendix that the Poor Relief Act of 1662 (the Settlement Act), which 
restricted the residence of the poor to their home parish, “operates too strongly in 
preventing marriages.”190 This was because it incentivized landlords to demolish rather 
than construct cottages on their estates to lessen the tax of the poor rate, which in turn 
caused individuals to remain single in the absence of available housing. Malthus 
concluded the discussion by stating he “will not presume to say positively that [the Poor 
Laws] greatly encourage population.”191  
 Malthus’ second argument is less convoluted. He asserts that the quantity of 
provisions consumed in workhouses by the poor of society diminishes the shares that 
would otherwise be consumed by “more industrious and more worthy members,” thus 
forcing individuals not receiving aid to become dependent upon poor relief.192 Malthus 
views poor relief as a zero-sum game, in which no aid can be given without a 
corresponding loss somewhere else in society. If the cost is great enough, it forces the 
loser to become dependent on parish aid for subsistence. Thus, Malthus denied the right 
of the poor to social subsistence on the grounds that the food given to them must be 
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extracted from the mouths of those who deserve it more. Nowhere is this more apparent 
than in the following passage appearing only in the 1803 edition of the Essay. 
A man who is born into a world already possessed, if he cannot get subsistence 
from his parents on whom he had a just demand, and if the society do not want his 
labor, has no claim of right to the smallest portion of food, and, in fact, has no 
business to be where he is. At nature’s mighty feast there is no vacant cover for 
him. She tells him to be gone, and she will quickly execute her own orders, if he 
does not work upon the compassion of some of her guests. If these guests get up 
and make room for him, other intruders immediately appear demanding the same 
favour. The report of a provision for all that come, fills the hall with numerous 
claimants. The order and harmony of the feast is disturbed, the plenty that before 
reigned is changed into scarcity; and the happiness of the guests is destroyed by 
the spectacle of misery and dependence in every part of the hall, and by the 
clamorous importunity of those, who are justly enraged at not finding the 
provision which they had been taught to expect. The guests learn too late their 
error, in counteracting those strict orders to all intruders, issued by the great 
mistress of the feast, who, wishing that all her guests should have plenty, and 
knowing that she could not provide for unlimited numbers, humanely refused to 
admit fresh comers when her table was already full.193 
 
Through the metaphor of a feast, Malthus emphasizes the finitude of the aggregate food 
of society. Food on society’s table must be distributed in smaller quantities to its guests 
for every newcomer admitted to the feast. There is no way to increase what has been 
prepared. There is only the means to alter the distribution of what already exists. Those 
individuals who have been chosen by nature have a just claim to the food on the table, 
while those who are not chosen have no inkling of a right to even the smallest scrap of 
food. By describing the distribution of the food as being ordained by nature, Malthus 
delegitimizes claims of the poor to a right to subsistence. By altering the distribution of 
food, the Poor Laws go against nature, and by extension the will of God, as God 
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expresses himself through the laws of nature.194 Though Malthus struck out this passage 
in subsequent editions of his work, the sentiment it expressed remained.195 
 Because of the harm attendant on the Poor Laws enumerated above, Malthus 
advocated for their total abolition. But he also wished to give society a period to adjust to 
their abolition rather than immediately get rid of all forms of poor relief. For this reason, 
his proposed solution is the passing of a regulation stipulating that no child born from any 
marriage is to be entitled to poor relief a year from the regulation’s enactment, and the 
same for a child born illegitimately from two years after the same date. The passage of 
time would ensure the elimination of all those who receive poor relief, which would de 
facto eliminate the Poor Laws. To circulate knowledge of the regulation he proposes that 
clergymen should reiterate to couples before marriage the obligation that parents must 
provide for their children without parish assistance. If couples marry and are unable to 
provide subsistence to their children and themselves, nature should be allowed to exert its 
will and the family must be left to suffer. Private charity would still exist, but Malthus 
argued it “should be administered very sparingly.”196  
 While in the printed editions of the Essay Malthus maintained the call for 
abolition, he revealed in his private correspondence that his views were shifting towards 
reform. In a letter to the minister and political economist Thomas Chalmers of July 21, 
1822, Malthus confided that he saw public support of the Poor Laws a strong enough 
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barrier to prevent the general adoption of the abolitionist cause. He believed that “the first 
improvement” was “likely to come from an improved administration of our actual laws, 
together with a more general system of education and moral superintendence.”197 Again 
writing to Chalmers on November 9, 1822, he stated that “from the present temper of the 
House of Commons, I own that I have latterly felt myself compelled to restrain my hopes 
of any thing like the complete abolition of the Poor Laws, and to satisfy myself with the 
prospect of amelioration of the present system.”198  
Though the Essay was later to go through its sixth edition with the call for 
abolition unmolested, Malthus’ attitude in his final public address on the Poor Laws was 
one of supporting conditional reform.  In A Summary View of the Principle of Population 
(1830), based on his anonymously published article on population for the 1824 
supplement to the fourth edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica, Malthus argued that the 
benefits of relief given to the poor by law  
depends mainly upon the feelings and habits of the labouring classes of society, 
and can only be determined by experience. If it be generally considered as so 
discreditable to receive parochial relief, that great exertions are made to avoid it, 
and few or none marry with a certain prospect of being obliged to have recourse 
to it, there is no doubt that those who were really in distress might be adequately 
assisted, with little danger of a constantly increasing proportion of paupers; and, 
in that case, a great good would be attained, without any proportionate evil to 
counterbalance it.199 
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He therefore conceded that the Poor Laws, under the right circumstances, could be 
beneficial to English society. This appears to be a reversal of his earlier argument that 
relieving the poor necessarily turns rate-payers into rate-receivers. According to the new 
line of thought, the advantages of poor relief are not counteracted by any attendant harms. 
Moreover, such a contention is an admission that reform along the lines of the workhouse 
test established by the New Poor Law would be welcome. The workhouse test, in short, 
entailed the elimination of relief given outside the workhouse and a reduction in the 
quality of life inside the workhouse to a level below the minimum held by the 
independent worker.200 In theory, this would ensure that only those truly in distress would 
submit themselves to the workhouse to receive poor relief. In practice, the policy was 
implemented irregularly and outdoor relief continued to be administered following the 
New Poor Law’s passage.  
Notwithstanding the congruence between the workhouse test and Malthus’ vision 
of reformed Poor Laws, the political economist remained silent on the New Poor Law 
despite living to see it become a legal reality. When considered in isolation, his silence 
cannot be taken for support or repudiation of the act. Yet, when viewed in conjunction 
with his implicit support of Marcet’s call for the Poor Laws’ abolition as expressed in her 
John Hopkins’s Notions on Political Economy, which will be made clear, it seems 
Malthus’ final position on the Poor Laws was a reversion back to his earlier abolitionist 
stance.  
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In contrast to their close adherence to Malthus’ principle of population in their 
literary works, Marcet and Martineau were more selective in following Malthus in his 
views on the Poor Laws. While the two used Malthusian arguments to critique the Poor 
Laws, they also utilized their own original arguments to persuade readers that the laws 
were detrimental to society. Their remedies were at first in agreement with Malthus’ 
well-known call for abolition. Later, however, their views morphed into proposals 
consonant with the effort to reform the Poor Laws undertaken by 1832 royal commission 
and realized by the 1834 amendment act.  
 
Marcet 
Marcet adopted from Malthus the cornerstone of her criticism of the Poor Law. 
Following Malthus, she argues that the Poor Laws stimulate population growth and 
engender downward mobility in Conversations on Political Economy and John Hopkins’s 
Notions on Political Economy. Targeted towards adolescents and workers respectively, 
the two works present Malthus’ arguments in simple language meant to persuade the 
uninitiated in political economy. They were evidently successful, receiving critical 
acclaim and going through multiple editions. 
Regarding Malthus’ contention that the Poor Laws stimulate population growth, 
Marcet argues that the Poor Laws incentivize imprudent marriages of individuals who 
have neither secured an income large enough to support a family, nor accumulated a 
stock of capital sufficient to alleviate distress caused by unforeseen circumstances. By 
offering sums of money to individuals so long as they have a family, the laws create the 
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conditions which they are supposed to alleviate. Through the operation of the Poor Laws, 
the number of individuals dependent upon parish relief increases.201  
Marcet illustrates Malthus’ argument on downward mobility in John Hopkins’s 
Notions on Political Economy. Here, the worker John Hopkins relates an anecdote of 
encountering an impoverished widow named Dixon at the vestry to collect poor relief. 
John asks her how she arrived a such a position, because he thought that her husband had 
left her a sizable income when he passed away. Dixon responds: “No, Master Hopkins; 
he did all he could not to bring me down to a lower station while he lived; but his means 
were but small, and the profits of our little shop did but just serve to maintain us.”202 She 
would have remained in her former station if not for the poor rate, which ate up all her 
savings. Now she is reduced to collecting poor relief for herself and her children, which 
she does only with “shame and sorrow.”203 John reassures her that she has a definite right 
to aid now that she is in need because she paid the poor rate for so long. This provides her 
little solace. The last image of the widow Dixon Marcet impresses upon the reader’s 
mind is one of downcast resignation. “God’s will be done!” she cries to Hopkins, tears 
streaming down her face.204 
The above two arguments may have been borrowed from Malthus, but Marcet 
also has an original argument against the old poor laws: they reduce the wages of labor. 
The poor rate which taxes the capitalist reduces his capital and his demand for labor, and 
so the remuneration he provides his laborers must necessarily be less than if he went 
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untaxed.205 Thus Farmer Stubbs tells John Hopkins that he “would willingly pay higher 
wages, and employ more hands, too, could I once be rid of this poor’s rate.”206 According 
to Marcet, the laws’ “greatest evil” is that they suck capital from its natural channels in 
order to relieve the poor.207 If the funds allotted for the poor laws were left in the 
circulating capital of England, workers would secure larger incomes for their families and 
be able to save for times of distress.208 
Marcet dramatizes the catastrophic effect of the Poor Laws by imagining a time 
when the increase of population they engender outweighs the ability of the parish to 
collect the assessed rates.209 She argues children reared by imprudent marriages will grow 
up to find no work for their numbers, so they themselves marry to secure income from 
the parish. With population far outweighing the demand for labor in the country, workers 
resort to crime, “for when a man cannot get a livelihood honestly by his labour, he is little 
like to resist a temptation that falls his way to get it otherwise, especially when he has 
been bred up to indolence.”210 Then workers are faced with imprisonment, but they will 
not stand for such a fate. So they riot, threaten, set fires, and cause mayhem.211 For 
Marcet, the Poor Laws have the potential to devolve society into a state of chaos. 
 In place of the Poor Laws, Marcet advocates for the vigorous education of 
working-class children in addition to their participation in institutions aimed at the 
cultivation of prudent habits. Adults are not the targets of education because “it is 
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difficult, if not impossible, to change the habits of men whose characters and formed, and 
settled … whilst youth and innocence may be moulded into any form you chuse to give 
them.”212 Education should render children “not only moral and religious, but industrious, 
frugal, and provident.”213 To this end, institutions aside from schools should be relied 
upon: those being friendly societies and savings banks.214 
 The friendly society, or benefits club, provides its members with a fund for relief 
in times of economic distress, sickness, or old age. It does so by collecting a small 
amount of monthly dues from each member. For Marcet, workers in friendly societies are 
among the deserving poor, who, in contrast to their undeserving counterparts, are 
“comparatively cleanly, industrious, sober, frugal, respecting themselves, and respected 
by others … they maintain an honourable pride and independence of character.”215 In the 
Conversations on Political Economy, Mrs. B. remarks to Caroline that her “prudent 
gardener Thomas is a member of one” such society.216 Caroline replies with the 
observation that the membership of individuals like Thomas to friendly societies 
incentivizes the poor to join, because the membership of economically secure individuals 
increases funds allotted to the relief of distressed members.217 In John Hopkins’s Notions 
on Political Economy, Farmer Stubbs tells John’s wife that “if your husband had been a 
prudent man, and had belonged to the benefit club, he might have got relief when his 
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children were sick, without going to the parish.”218 Participating in friendly societies 
teaches the poor the benefits of pooling resources for times of hardship. 
Yet friendly societies were not without their flaws. They apparently failed 
regularly to meet the needs of their sick members, as many of their members had no 
recourse when ill but reliance on the poor rates. This fact is affirmed by even as ardent a 
supporter of friendly society as Samuel Roberts, who wanted to legislatively mandate that 
every individual in England join a society. He wrote: “Hundreds, perhaps I may safely 
say, thousands of old men, in the parish where I reside, have been thrown, in sickness, 
upon the Poor Rates for relief, after having paid for thirty or forty years, their 
contribution regularly to the club; in many instances without having ever received any 
thing out of it.”219 The pauper John Hall attests to this reality in a September 16, 1819 
letter to his parish, wherein he admits his application for relief comes after being denied 
sick pay from his friendly society. 
I Beg Lieve [sic] to Iform [sic] you that I Stand in further Assistance for I Am 
Lame in my Leg through A Strain & am unable To Work so Sir I hope you Will 
Not think it Ill of my going to this Parrish for Relief for my Club Box is Shut Up 
& have No feind [sic] to go for any thing But you I have two Children that is Not 
able to do any thing So Sir I hope you Will Send An Order to the Oversears [sic] 
of Chelmsford for they dont Like to Any thing Without your Order I Am your 
Humble Petitioner John Hall.220 
 
Failure to provide for sick individuals was not the only shortcoming of friendly 
societies. In some instances, when funds were allotted to sick members they were 
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insufficient to provide for the sustenance of themselves and their families. Such was the 
case for Samuel White, who admitted so in a May 21, 1828 letter to a vestry clerk. 
Haveing [sic] been favoured with Pretty good health in my own Person and 
Family I have not made any application to my Parish for about sixteen Months 
and if Providence had Continued the Blessing I would still have kept from so 
doing – but I am sorry to inform you that I am ill and unable to work I have been 
Poorly for several weeks but Continued to work till the Doctor informed me I 
should not get better till I left off – I am in a Clubb and receive 10/6 per week but 
that is not near enough for the support of eight of us – especialy [sic] as I am 
recommended by the Docter [sic] to take nourishing things which it will be the 
interest of the Parish to enable me to get that I may be the sooner restored to 
health and strength any sum the select vestry may be Pleased to allow me till that 
Period will be thankfully received.221 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, Marcet argues that the poor are impoverished because 
of their tendency to produce excessively large families. She advocates for friendly 
societies to alleviate these families in times of sickness. But the funds of these societies, 
as evidenced by White’s letter, are not always sufficient to provide for large numbers. 
Thomas the gardener may be prudent to join a friendly society, but he is a bachelor and 
so his needs when ill can be met with the funds provided by his society. The same cannot 
be said for workers with excessively large families, which Marcet argues are manifold. 
The utility of the friendly society appears especially suspect when considered in this 
light. 
 In addition to friendly societies, another institution Marcet argues the working 
classes should utilize is the savings bank. In these the poor should place a portion of their 
incomes and accrue monthly interest on their deposits, in this way acquiring the habit of 
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frugality.222 In the fifth edition of his Essay (1817), Malthus sang the praises of savings 
banks, asserting that they appear “much the best, and most likely, if they become general, 
to effect a permanent improvement in the condition of the lower classes of society.”223 
Little known is that the Quaker political economist Priscilla Bell Wakefield was the first 
to establish such an institution.224 She did so in Tottenham on October 22, 1798.225 
Initially Wakefield’s bank was solely for the use of children, but its success quickly 
spawned a similar institution for adults. With the backing of six philanthropically-minded 
trustees, Wakefield’s bank conducted business on the first Monday of each month. At this 
time workers, servants, and other members of the poor could deposit sums above one 
shilling or withdraw their savings as needed. Every twenty shillings a person deposited 
would accrue interest at an annual rate of 5%. The funds collected by the bank were 
divided into £100 sums to be distributed evenly among the trustees. For every £100 
collected in in excess of the original £600, a new trustee would be chosen in order to 
preserve the equitable distribution of risk. In an ideal situation, the poor would utilize 
these banks to save sums of money for the time when they became elderly or infirm, so as 
to not pass their later years in a parish workhouse.226  
 Wakefield, Malthus, and Marcet were not the only political economists concerned 
with savings banks. Ricardo spent some of his fortune gained from the stock market in 
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founding a savings bank in Gloucestershire. He reveals this in a December 10, 1817 letter 
to Hutches Trower. 
We have established a Savings Bank in this neighbourhood in the formation of 
which I have been very active. I was the only one practically acquainted with such 
Institutions and therefore my services have been much more highly appreciated 
than they deserved. We give a half penny per month for every 13/-. In six weeks 
we have received about £1100 which may be said to be tolerably successful, but 
we understand that a strong prejudice exists among the manufacturing classes 
against us. They think we have some sinister object—that we wish to keep wages 
down. Time and good temper will overcome this feeling and convince the 
prejudiced how that the rich have no other personal object in view excepting the 
interest which every man must feel in good government,—and in the general 
prosperity. The success of these Banks would be great if the enormous abuses of 
the Poor Laws were corrected.227 
 
As evidenced by Ricardo’s letter, the ideology behind the savings bank presumed a 
harmony of interests between its well-endowed founders and their poor counterparts. But 
the rich took pains to distinguish between members of the poorer classes who deserved 
participation in such institutions and those who did not and were likely to abuse their 
inclusion. This is the distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor, or in 
Marcet’s language, “the industrious poor” and “the indolent and profligate.”228 For 
Marcet, those who relieve the poor ought to “consider it as a duty to ascertain whether the 
object whom we relieve is in real want, and we should proportion our charity not only to 
his distress, but also to his merits.”229 This not only excludes the undeserving poor from 
relief, but ensures that members of the poor who have come to ruin through irresponsible 
behavior are less attended to than their industrious brethren. Discriminate relief would 
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disincentivize imprudence, as meritorious workers would no longer be able to look to 
their idle counterparts and find them as well provided for as their own.230 
With universal education, friendly societies, and savings banks in mind, Marcet 
argues for the abolition of the Poor Laws in John Hopkins’s Notions on Political 
Economy. Reminiscent of Malthus, she suggests that a law be passed that stipulates no 
child born after three or four years is to be entitled to parish relief. This would provide a 
buffer period where society adjusts to the absence of the Poor Laws. Workers would be 
discouraged from having more children while those that receive relief pass away in the 
course of time. Eventually those on whom the rate is accessed would retain the income 
which previously was subject to taxation, and the demand for labor, and consequently 
wages, would rise.231 Notable is that Malthus wrote Marcet after reading Hopkins’s 
Notions and complained only of her treatment of the Corn Laws, the abolition of which, 
we will see in the next chapter, she thought of as being unequivocally advantageous. 
Malthus promised to purchase a dozen copies of the work to distribute to the cottagers in 
his neighborhood, so convinced was he of the soundness of Marcet’s doctrines.232 
Evidently Malthus was satisfied with her call for the abolition of the Poor Laws despite 
his admonition three years earlier that reformed Poor Laws would be beneficial to 
society. Malthus’ silence on the Poor Laws in the letter to Marcet lends credence to the 
view that he remained in favor of abolition to the end of his life in spite of his shifting 
opinion on reform. 
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While Marcet advocates for abolition in Hopkins’s Notions, the seventh edition of 
her Conversations on Political Economy (1839) instead supports the reforms of the 1834 
Poor Law Amendment Act. There Marcet approves of the act’s implementation of the 
workhouse test. This, she asserts, has stimulated the initiative of many families who 
previously would have contented themselves with receiving parochial aid. Wishing to 
avoid the workhouse, they now endeavor to maintain themselves and remain 
independent.233 The confinement of relief to the workhouse, she argues, has also made 
numbers of the formerly undeserving poor labor for themselves in rejection of the 
alternative to work for the parish. Marcet holds that poor relief under the New Poor Law 
caters to the deserving poor above all. The workhouse provides food, shelter, and medical 
care, while every able-bodied workhouse inhabitant labors for the necessities of life. 
Marcet credits these measures with reducing the expenditure of the poor rates from eight 
million pounds to four million, the savings of which now circulate the country as capital 
in maintenance of the independent worker. As a result of this increase of circulating 
capital, the demand for labor  increases, and in consequence so do the real wages of the 
working class. Marcet is sure that it “is the idle and vicious who are alone losers by these 
new regulations.”234 
One is struck by how well Marcet popularizes Malthus’ thought on the Poor Laws 
as she simultaneously goes beyond him by promoting institutions and legal reforms 
independent of his proposals. Malthus had little to say about friendly societies and 
 
233 Marcet, Conversations, 7th ed., 152. 
234 Ibid., 152-4. Clark and Page have disputed the claim that the New Poor Law increased wages. See 
Gregory Clark and Marianne E. Page, “Welfare reform, 1834: Did the New Poor Law in England produce 
significant economic gains?” Cliometrica 13 (2019), 238-9, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11698-018-0174-4. 
72 
 
savings bank prior to the appearance of the Conversations on Political Economy.235 
Though he admitted reform could be beneficial, he remained silent on the passing of the 
New Poor Law and supported Marcet’s call for abolition. While popularizing Malthus 
was without a doubt part of the function of her writings on the Poor Laws, she diverges 
from the elder political economist by articulating original arguments on wages, friendly 
societies, and savings banks, while also supporting the reforms of an act on which 
Malthus abstained from commenting. It must be concluded that Marcet was more than a 
popularizer of Malthus’ ideas regarding the Poor Laws. 
 
Martineau 
Martineau’s critique of the Poor Laws comes in “Cousin Marshall,” the eighth number in 
her series Illustrations of Political Economy. In “Cousin Marshall,” Martineau critiques 
the poor laws on seven fronts: (1) their stimulation of population growth; (2) their 
tendency to turn rate-payers into rate-receivers; (3) their exorbitant expenditure; (4) their 
equivocation with regard to different types of poverty; (5) their corruptive influence on 
the morals of their administrators and of the poor; (6) their prevention of rural economic 
development; and (7) their restriction of settlement. Only (1) and (2) are Malthusian 
arguments. At the core of Martineau’s critique is the concept of the wage fund, which 
stipulates that the average rate of wages is ascertained through dividing capital (i.e. the 
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“wage fund”) by the number of laborers it maintains, or 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 =  
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
.236 For 
Martineau, the Poor Laws appropriate capital from its natural place in the wage fund, and 
thereby reduce the capital available for the subsistence of honest laborers in favor of 
providing for the poor. This disincentivizes industrious behavior while at the same time 
incentivizing idleness. 
Regarding the first critique—that the Poor Laws stimulate population growth—
Martineau places blame squarely upon the Speenhamland system of allowances 
implemented in 1795. This measure guaranteed increasing amounts of relief based upon 
the number of children possessed by the poor. Such relief provided a stimulus to 
population growth because it incentivized marriage by providing increasing amounts of 
aid to families.237 Recent historical scholarship has not been kind to this argument. In 
their cliometric study of the Poor Laws, the economists Gregory Clark and Marianne 
Page (2019) conclude that the laws did not induce significantly higher fertility rates.238 
The historical demographers E. A. Wrigley and Richard M. Smith (2020) analyze the 
results of the 1851 census and find that the counties which adopted the Speenhamland 
system had marriage patterns comparable to the counties that did not adopt the system. 
The marital proportions of women aged 45-69 in 1851, whose marriages were primarily 
contracted under the Speenhamland system, were within 1% of the marital proportions of 
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similarly aged women in non-Speenhamland counties when accounting for the effects of 
the higher sex ratio of Speenhamland counties.239  
Martineau’s second argument concerning downward mobility relates firstly to the 
clause in the Poor Laws guaranteeing employment to those who cannot procure it for 
themselves. She argues that employment is strictly limited by the wage fund; it is 
impossible to extend employment to numbers in excess of what the circulating capital of 
England can support. Therefore efforts towards providing employment to the 
unemployed remove independent workers from their rightful occupations, and in turn 
make them dependent upon the poor rates for sustenance. The state thus maintains the 
condition of pauperism it attempts to alleviate.240 Secondly, Martineau argues that the 
growing numbers of the poor increase the poor-rates levied on rates-payers, sinking their 
condition down into rate-receivers. Members of all classes who pay the poor rate find 
themselves turned into paupers.241 She illustrates this in the case of the small farmer. The 
amount he pays for the poor rate increases as the numbers of poor increase. He pays more 
and more until his profits are extinguished; then he must give up his landholdings one 
after another until nothing remains but his fixed capital, which is promptly seized. Then 
he is forced to turn to the parish for relief. For Martineau, to speak of “security of 
property” under the poor laws is laughable. There is no more security of property “than 
there is security of life to a poor wretch in quicksand, who feels himself swallowed up 
inch by inch.”242 
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The creation of paupers is especially true in the case of parishes adopting the 
Speenhamland system, which proportioned poor relief to the price of wheaten bread. For 
Martineau, this has the effect of taking bread out of the mouths of those who earned it, 
because the amount of bread available for maintenance is a function of the wage fund. As 
such, a given quantity of aid to the poor necessarily means a subtraction from the wage 
fund, which lowers wages and sends workers to the parish for aid.243 
As it pertains to her third argument, the Poor Laws’ expenditure appears 
especially suspect to Martineau given that the wage fund has not increased at a rate 
comparable to the poor rates. She takes the period of the previous 100 years, noting that 
while capital has increased rapidly, it is nowhere near the rate of the Poor Laws’ 
expenditure, which has risen from five or six hundred thousand pounds per annum to 
upwards of eight million.244 Hence Martineau complains of excessive taxation weighing 
heavily upon the middle and upper classes. This critique lends credence to her criticism 
that the Poor Laws engender downward mobility. 
As regards critique four, Martineau criticizes the workhouse for equating all the 
different strata of poor which enter its walls. She represents the deserving poor in the 
character of Susan, an unemployed domestic servant who has fallen on hard times 
through no fault of her own. Susan arrives at the workhouse and is placed on equal 
footing with individuals whose impoverishment is due to their own malfeasance. In this 
manner the deserving and undeserving poor are equated, “poverty and indigence 
confounded, and blameless and culpable indigence, temporary distress, and permanent 
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destitution, all mixed up together, and placed under the same treatment.”245 Martineau 
argues that there should be a clear distinction between temporary and lasting indigence, 
as well as innocent and culpable indigence, inside of the workhouse, as between poverty 
and indigence outside of it.246 Efforts ought to be made to sharply distinguish not only the 
deserving and undeserving poor, but also between the graduations of poor within such 
classifications. For Martineau, the deserving poor include certain individuals who are 
permanently indigent, such as the disabled. It does them a disservice to classify them 
alongside not only the poor whose impoverishment is the consequence of vice, but also 
the honest worker whose hardship is the result of transient causes such as a fluctuation in 
the trade cycle. 
 Critique five—that the Poor Laws corrupt the morals of the poor—can be seen in 
the characters of Mrs. Bell and Childe. Mrs. Bell is a mother who gains aid from the 
parish for one of her children who has died; while Childe is a beggar who feigns sickness 
in order to collect more relief from his parish. For Martineau, fault for these fraudulent 
attempts at collecting poor relief lies at the feet of the Poor Laws. Actions such as these 
“would never have been dreamed of unless suggested and encouraged by a system which 
destroys the natural connexion between labour and its rewards.”247 The same may be said 
of the corrupt morals of the Poor Law administrators, many of whom “pocket[] every 
penny that can be saved out of [the poor’s] accommodation,” and perform other nefarious 
deeds.248 
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 The character Farmer Dale provides the rationale behind the Poor Laws impeding 
rural economic development, Martineau’s sixth critique. Dale complains that taxation 
prevents him from cultivating a promising piece of land because “the tithe and the poor-
rate together would just swallow up the whole profit.”249 This is especially onerous given 
that England’s bountiful population is in need of increased subsistence.  In addition to 
preventing the cultivation of farmland, the poor rates impede economic development by 
preventing the construction of homes for England’s increasing rural population. 
Proprietors are taxed so heavily by the poor rates that no more houses than those 
absolutely necessary are built. The poor in rural areas thus find themselves in need of 
housing and migrate to urban areas in hopes of fulfilling the need. This overcrowds urban 
areas, so that the poor are forced to migrate back to their villages in search of work to 
feed their families. “If it were not for the poor-rate,” Martineau insists, “we should see in 
every parish many a rood tilled that now lies waste, and many a row of cottages tenanted 
by those who now help to breed corruption in towns.”250 
 Martineau’s seventh critique of the Poor Laws, relating to the Settlement Act, is 
reminiscent of Adam Smith. Smith criticized the Settlement Act because it impeded the 
ability of parishes to realize their maximum economic growth. This was because it 
reduced the profits of capital by restricting the free movement of labor. By tying a worker 
to the parish through the Settlement Act, the Poor Laws prevent movement to the most 
dynamic sectors of the economy with most favorable remunerations of labor.251 When the 
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profits of capital are stunted, so too is the capacity of parishes to grow economically, as 
capitalists cannot reinvest their capital to grow their businesses to the extent that they 
could without the limitations of their labor supply imposed by the Poor Laws. In this 
vein, Martineau complains that the Settlement Act prevents workers from migrating to 
parishes with high demand for labor, as signaled by high wages.252 Just as critiques (1) 
and (2) can be considered popularizations of Malthus’ arguments, critique (7) can be seen 
as a popularization of Smith’s. 
 Most of Martineau’s criticisms of the Poor Laws cannot be traced to Malthus and 
seem to have been generated independently of any direct influence. Aside from critiques 
(1), (2), and (7), Maritneau’s arguments do not resemble those made by her political 
economist predecessors.253 She was certainly a fervent believer in the wage fund doctrine 
and in that regard had probably been most influenced by Marcet, McCulloch, and Mill, 
but they did not take the doctrine to the conclusions she reached. It appears, then, that 
Martineau was not just a popularizer of other political economist’s ideas. She articulated 
original arguments while intervening in a pressing and contemporary policy debate.254 
Scholars should have taken notice of this, yet the monographs on the Poor Law debate are 
silent on Martineau’s contributions.255 
In proposing an alternative to the Poor Laws, Martineau takes pains to discredit 
the idea that charity is a viable mechanism for the alleviation of poverty. She argues that 
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charitable institutions such as hospitals, dispensaries, and alms houses perpetuate poverty 
rather than alleviate it. Such charitable institutions stimulate population growth beyond 
what the country’s means of subsistence can provide, so that the growing population 
finds itself acutely impoverished and consequently suffers from diseases.256 The only 
charitable institutions that should remain are schools—which should offer free education 
to all—asylums for the impotent, and casualty hospitals for emergency medical aid.257 
These institutions offer no bounty to population, and in the case of schools, actually 
counteract the tendency of the lower classes to reproduce without regard to their 
economic futures.258 
Martineau’s proposals to reduce the numbers of dependent poor are derived from 
the concept of the wage fund. She argues that to reduce the numbers of the indigent, only 
two measures can be taken: (1) the wage fund ought to be increased; and (2) the numbers 
of laborers ought to be proportioned to the capital delineated to their subsistence.259 For 
both ends she proposes to gradually repurpose funds for poor relief to the purposes of 
production. This, Martineau asserts, would not only increase the amount of capital in the 
fund, but also proportion the population of workers to the wage fund (presumably 
through eliminating the Poor Laws’ incentivization of marriage).260 It was this logic 
which led Martineau to argue for the abolition of the Poor Laws. 
 In “Cousin Marshall,” Martineau argues that the repurposing of capital and 
proportioning of population can only be done through the abolition of the Poor Laws. She 
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mentions friendly societies and savings banks as useful tools for laborers in the case of 
hardship,261 but her final recommendation is the same as that of Malthus: the enactment 
of a law stipulating that no child born within a year of its passing and no illegitimate 
child born within two years of its passing is to be entitled to parish assistance.262 With the 
passing of generations comes the abolition of the Poor Laws, a process she argues will be 
gradual enough to ensure society can adapt to the change with as few problems as 
possible. 
In her later series Poor Laws and Paupers Illustrated (1833-4), however, 
Martineau advocates reforms identical to those proposed by the Poor Laws Comissioner’s 
Report of 1834 and enacted by the New Poor Law. This series was commissioned by 
Henry Brougham and the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, who supplied 
Martineau with evidence collected by the 1832 Royal Commission into the Operation of 
the Poor Laws.263 The amount of evidence was overwhelming. As she told the publisher 
William Tait in a December 28, 1832 letter, “[h]ow long I shall go on, I do not know, but 
I might go on for 50 years to come. I have materials for a thousand & one tales before 
me.”264 The conclusions she deduced from the evidence were probably influenced by 
Nassau William Senior, who visited Martineau during 1832-4 to discuss the Poor 
Laws.265 Nevertheless these conclusions reflected her own ideological commitments as a 
political economist and utilitarian.266 Composed of members with the same ideological 
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makeup—the most important whom were the Benthamite Edwin Chadwick and the 
political economist Senior—the Poor Law Commissioners were bound to derive the same 
conclusions as Martineau given the same data set.267 The New Poor Law derived its 
provisions directly from the suggestions from the commissioner’s report and naturally 
was based upon these same conclusions. In her autobiography, Martineau recalled the 
experience of discovering the similarity of her proposals and those enacted by New Poor 
Law when musing upon the evidence provided to her by Brougham. 
There can be no stronger proof of the strength of this evidence than the uniformity 
of the suggestions to which it gave rise in all the minds which were then intent on 
finding the remedy. I was requested to furnish my share of conclusions and 
suggestions. I did so, in the form of a programme of doctrine for my illustrations, 
some of which expose the evils of the old system, while others pourtray the 
features of its proposed successor. My document actually crossed in the street one 
sent me by a Member of the government detailing the heads of the new Bill. I sat 
down to read it with no little emotion, and some apprehension; and the moment 
when, arriving at the end, I found that the government scheme and my own were 
identical, point by point, was not one to be easily forgotten. I never wrote any 
thing with more glee than “The Hamlets,”—the number in which the proposed 
reform is exemplified; and the spirit of that work carried me through the great 
effort of writing that number and “Cinnamon and Peals” in one month,—during a 
country visit in the glorious summer weather.268 
 
 “The Hamlets” tells the story of a rural parish saved from imminent economic 
collapse by several reforms to its system of poor relief. Economic collapse is impending 
because poor relief is being administered indiscriminately in the parish so that the 
number of recipients has risen until every poor person in the region continually applies 
for aid under a plethora of pretexts, many illegitimate. Martineau likens pauperism to a 
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“curse” and compares its spread to “one of the Egyptian abominations, penetrat[ing] into 
the recesses of every house.”269 Parish officials banish the curse through abolishing all 
forms of relief distributed outside the workhouse and running the local workhouse 
according to what Martineau considers to be the original legal principles established by 
the Poor Relief Act of 1601. All inmates now must work for lodging and food, adults are 
split from the elderly and children—who are housed and schooled separately—and life in 
the workhouse is made markedly less desirable than that of the independent worker 
outside. By making the workhouse a test of true destitution, the parish is ridden of 
fraudulent claims to relief. As the English literature scholar Claudia Oražem notes, the 
symbol of the changes undergone by the parish is an elderly woman named Goody 
Gidney, whom Martineau portrays as a blight upon society for living in a workhouse for 
more than 70 years while living entirely off the labor of others. Gidney dies despised by 
the community as a disgrace to society. The transformation undergone by the parish 
affects positive change: those in the workhouse leave to seek independent employment, 
the poor rates decrease, wages rise, and the tale ends with the closure of the local 
workhouse.270 
By concluding that the Poor Laws should be reformed rather than abolished, 
Martineau moves beyond the popularization of Malthus into the role of a social reformer. 
While Malthus was favorable towards reform in his Summary View, his final stance 
shifted back to the abolitionism he maintained in all editions of the Essay on the 
Principle of Population. Moreover, his vacillating opinion on reform cannot be said to 
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have influenced the reformist views Martineau developed independent of any published 
treatise. Like her novel arguments against the Poor Laws, Martineau’s proposed reforms 
are evidence of her originality as a thinker—an originality overlooked in most scholarly 
accounts of her popularization of political economy.271 
 
Conclusion 
There is a mixture of consonance and difference between the treatment of the Poor Laws 
of Malthus, Marcet, and Martineau. Marcet and Martineau popularized Malthus’ 
arguments that the laws stimulate population growth and engender downward mobility, 
but they supplemented those contentions with original arguments. Marcet criticized the 
Poor Laws for lowering wages, while she supported savings banks and friendly societies 
for their tendency to impart prudential habits to the poor. Martineau criticized the Poor 
Laws for their excessive expenditure, their conflation of different types of 
impoverishment, their tendency to corrupt the morals of the Poor Law overseers and their 
constituents, and their prevention of rural economic development. Marcet and Martineau 
first called for the abolition of the Poor Laws according to the proposal laid out by 
Malthus, but the two later advocated for the reforms of the New Poor Law. Their 
advocacy of reform was congruent with but not influenced by the opinion Malthus 
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espoused in his Summary View. The difference between Malthus’s proposals and those of 
Marcet and Martineau can be attributed to ingenuity and a genuine desire to improve the 
lot of the poor. 
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IV. CORN LAWS 
On April 4, 1845, 2,000 women-activists gathered at the Hanover Square Rooms 
at the behest of the Anti-Corn Law League in preparation for their grand bazaar about to 
be held in the Covent Garden Theater.272 The League relied upon women to distribute 
tracts, collect signatures for petitions, fundraise, prepare items for sale, host tea parties—
and now it called upon them to hear an address from the orator William Johnson Fox. 
Taking the stage, Fox posed a thought experiment to the women. If the river which 
flowed to the sea through London were to alter its course and encircle the county of 
Middlesex, isolating its inhabitants from the farmers of the rest of the country as the Corn 
Laws sought to do to England in regard to the produce of the world, what would result? 
The recreational plots of Hampstead Heath would be put under plow, rents would 
increase, and the price of grain would rise. Unable to find remuneration for their labor, 
many would emigrate with heavy hearts to foreign lands where food could be had for 
cheap. But why need he tell them this, Fox maintained, when it was a story they already 
knew—he told them only that which had been “beautifully described in such bold and 
strong language by Mrs. Loudon, in her philanthropic economy, by Mrs. Marcett [sic] 
with such elegance in her almost fairy works, and with such varied and beautiful 
illustrations by the unfailing resources, the elegant and powerful language of Harriet 
Martineau.”273 In response, the crowd of women erupted in cheer. 
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As evidenced by the response to Fox’s evocation of Marcet, Martineau, and 
Loudon, a major component of the audience for women’s political economy was 
politically engaged women. The three women had endeavored to politicize women by 
teaching them the fundamentals of political economy in familiar language and by relating 
the science to their domestic lives. They were successful, as their names were sufficient 
to rile up scores of women at a meeting of a leading political organization of the 1840s. 
This chapter proports to reconstruct the arguments of Jane Haldimand Marcet, Harriet 
Martineau, and Margracia Ryves Loudon against the English Corn Laws—a series of 
restrictions on the importation of foreign cereal grains into England enforced between 
1815 and 1846—while contextualizing the arguments within their author’s greater 
mission of teaching women political economy. Their arguments are contrasted with those 
of Malthus, who was infamous for defending restrictions on the importation of grain. The 
Corn Laws were thus an issue on which women political economists deviated 
significantly from Malthus.  
 This chapter is divided into six sections. The first section provides arguments as 
to how the three women attempted to persuade their women readers that political 
economy could be synchronous with their traditional responsibilities. Section two 
examines the views of Malthus, centering on his two pamphlets released during the Corn 
Law debates of 1814-5. The third section examines the arguments put forth by the 
women against the Corn Laws. All were agreed upon the fact that the Corn Laws raised 
the price of grain through cultivating inferior land. Section four reconstructs the shared 
vision of free trade the three advocated, showing that they envisaged a scenario in which 
England traded manufactured goods to agricultural countries in exchange for cheap grain. 
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Section five interrogates how all three tried to persuade landowners to join the side of 
free trade, as it was landowners who held the power to abolish the Laws. The concluding 
section offers a brief summary of the entire chapter. 
 
Women, Political Economy, and the Corn Laws 
It was through teaching the science of political economy that Marcet, Martineau, and 
Loudon sought to mobilize female action against the Corn Laws. Aside from Malthus, 
political economists were united in their opposition to the Corn Laws and economic 
protectionism more generally.274 The three women took the fundamental principle of free 
trade espoused by most political economists—most notably by Ricardo—and distilled it 
into texts intended to be easily digestible for women and others uninitiated in political 
economy. Whether through the form of literature or the slim nonfictional tract, the 
women expressed their arguments in plain language and substantiated them with lengthy 
explanatory passages or illustrations. Intervening in a pressing policy issue of the Corn 
Laws, a central goal of the enterprise was to mobilize readers to action. The action the 
three writers envisaged varied, ranging from somewhat benign conversation to politically 
charged petitioning, but in all cases they had to contend with the dominant gender 
ideology of the time, the separate spheres doctrine. This ideology served as the rationale 
to bar women from meddling in the politics of the male-centric public sphere. Dealing 
with this ideology often meant relating political action in the public sphere to feminine 
action in the domestic sphere. Marcet did this by making the polite conversation of ladies 
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a tool of political discourse; Martineau by connecting domestic economy to political 
economy; Loudon by subsuming “political” economy under “philanthropic” economy. 
With the connection between the political and the domestic established, the door was 
opened for women to take action to abolish the Corn Laws. 
 Marcet’s goal in writing the Conversations on Political Economy was to arm 
women with knowledge of the science so that they may promulgate truths in daily 
conversation. This contention naturally lends itself to knowledge of the drawbacks of the 
Corn Laws and the benefits of free trade. Early in the book, the two protagonists Mrs. B. 
and her pupil Caroline engage in a dialog on the utility of ladies being competent in 
political economy. Caroline describes it as the most uninteresting of all subjects and 
asserts there is no purpose for ladies to study it. Mrs. B. counters by calling attention to 
the fact that political economy is intimately connected with the content of the 
conversation ladies partake in. Caroline herself has been caught musing on the current 
scarcity of grain, blaming farmers for holding back their supply to raise its price.275 By 
asserting such she propagates errors in political economy, ignorant as she is that, as 
Marcet aruges, scarcity is attendant to the agricultural cycle under the Corn Laws. Mrs. 
B. scolds Caroline for resigning herself to ignorance, for, in contrast to chemistry or 
astronomy, the science of political economy is “intimately connected with the daily 
occurrences of life.” While propagating errors in chemistry or astronomy matter little as 
relating to the daily occurrences of life, doing so in the realm of political economy can 
lead to “serious practical errors.”276 If women were to have the ear of a member of 
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parliament and convinced him that pursuing a policy of agricultural protectionism would 
be best to stimulate demand for manufactured goods, he might enact legislation which 
would stunt manufacturing capital’s accumulation by confining worker’s transactions to 
life’s first necessities. Women, therefore, ought to arm themselves with knowledge of the 
benefits of free trade and be ready to disseminate truths through conversation to combat 
falsities. 
 Marcet’s insistence that women study political economy to propagate correct 
arguments in conversation has an ambivalent relationship to the dominant ideology of 
separate spheres which relegates women’s responsibilities to the household. She does not 
advocate for women to take an active role in the public sphere through political activity, 
yet she politicizes the discourse espoused by women in the domestic sphere by 
convincing them to take argumentative stances on policy issues like the Corn Laws. To a 
certain degree, Marcet’s politicization of discourse expands the domestic sphere’s realm 
of influence to include elements of the public, while her limiting of women’s political 
activity to discourse reifies masculine domination of the public sphere. Despite this 
ambivalence towards the separate spheres doctrine, Marcet’s writings were great 
influences upon women who transgressed the doctrine by participating in the movement 
to abolish the Corn Laws. Marcet even implicitly endorsed their activities by donating 
500 copies of John Hopkins’s Notions on Political Economy to the Anti-Corn Law 
League in May of 1845 in preparation for their grand bazaar held in the Covent Garden 
Theatre.277 
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 More forthcoming towards the separate spheres doctrine are Martineau’s writings, 
which at the time of her Illustrations of Political Economy were conflicted on issues of 
gender. In 1823, she had pseudonymously published an article in the Unitarian periodical 
The Monthly Repository which made the case for vigorous female education 
simultaneously as it maintained that the proper sphere for women is the household.278 
Nine years later she published “Ella of Garveloch,” an installment of her Illustrations of 
Political Economy series featuring a female protagonist who is the lease-holder of a small 
farm, giving her a prominent role in the public sphere at a time when property rights for 
women were scarce.279 Evidently Martineau’s perspective had shifted, a change which 
would reach its apogee in the writings immediately following her Illustrations. In How to 
Observe Morals and Manners (1838), she lamented that one finds married women 
everywhere “treated as the inferior party in a compact in which both parties have an equal 
interest,” from indigenous Americans to Englishwomen, the latter of which are 
less than half-educated, precluded from earning a subsistence, except in a very 
few ill-paid employments, and prohibited from giving or withholding their assent 
to laws which they are yet bound by penalties to obey … The degree of the 
degradation of woman is as good a test as the moralist can adopt for ascertaining 
the state of domestic morals in any country.280 
 
One way which Martineau fought the degradation of women was to educate them. 
Through her didactic novellas, she promulgated the ideas of political economy to women. 
To make the science relatable to her audience, she likened it to the domestic economy of 
the household. In the household, the family adhering to the principles of domestic 
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economy has all its members temperately fed, wholesomely clothed, and with money in 
pocket. It falls upon the people of England, its women included, to adhere to the 
principles of political economy to ensure the nation experiences the same fate.281 
Martineau’s educational endeavor was successful, evoking comments such as those of the 
9th Lord Kinnaird, George William Fox Kinnaird, at a meeting of the Anti-Corn Law 
League in May of 1845. There he ranked Martineau’s Illustrations of Political Economy 
among the “masterly productions” of Smith, Ricardo, and Marcet, and recommended 
them to “the ladies more especially” because of their literary qualities.282 
Martineau provides a role for women in the public sphere through the use of the 
petition. In one of the final scenes of her anti-Corn Law novella, “Sowers not Reapers,” 
citizens agree to draft a petition during a general assembly to influence parliament against 
restrictions on the grain trade.283 Women are naturally included among the petition’s 
signees. Martineau’s advocation of the petition is consonant with her status as a member 
of the Anti-Corn Law League,284 which ran a campaign to collect signatures to petition 
Queen Victoria. The Anti-Corn Law League Circular emphasized the need to get women 
involved in the campaign relatively early on, noting on December 20, 1839, 
We do think that petitions to the queen from the wives and mothers of … Great 
Britain … ought to be immediately compared and signed. It is not the husband 
and the father who have to still the heart-rending cry of starving childhood for 
food. … This is emphatically a mother’s question. It is a mother’s duty to take it 
up. … British matrons! Be up then and doing. Help us with the eloquence of your 
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sweet plaintive voices, and of your infants’ cries. Hunger breaks stone walls; but 
you may yet perform a greater wonder; turn hearts of stone into hearts of flesh.285 
 
Women heeded the call and petitioned the queen. Of the 729 petitions, memorials and 
addresses sent to the queen from January 1841 to April 1842, 306 came from women, 
including one giant petition from the “women of England” with a total of 255,271 
signatures.286 Describing herself in a letter to Richard Cobden of December 27, 1845 as a 
Peelite and a Cobdenite, but “more than either, a Leaguer,” Martineau endorsed the 
League’s efforts to collect signatures from women.287 Campaigns along these lines were 
perhaps what Martineau had in mind when she stressed in her summary of political 
economy, “The Moral of Many Fables,” that England’s people should constantly petition 
parliament for free trade; “[d]ay and night, from week to week, from month to month, the 
nation should petition for a free trade in corn.”288 
Loudon connected feminine action in the domestic realm to political action in the 
public realm by subsuming “political” economy under the more compassionate 
“philanthropic” economy, defined as “a disposition of things based on the principle of 
good-will to all, thus necessarily including equal justice, and active benevolence.”289 
While women will likely confound “political” economy with political intrigue, and 
therefore associate it with corruption, contention, and party politics, they will understand 
“philanthropic” economy to alleviate want, enlighten ignorance, cease injustice, and 
cultivate sympathies. In Loudon’s view, the Corn Laws have the greatest impact on the 
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poor—a condition which was then understood as having to labor continually to secure 
subsistence—so it is their cause which philanthropic economy champions. Philanthropic 
economy’s end can only be attained through establishing a proportion between the wages 
of labor and the price of grain as will secure to the poor (or, in other words, workers) the 
comforts of a decent life in exchange for a sensible amount of their time and effort 
embodied in labor.290 In this aim Loudon was influenced most by Torrens, whom she 
cites, as it was Torrens who insisted real wages must at minimum be sufficient to afford 
working families the amenities of a respectable existence.291 By locating philanthropic 
economy’s aim in helping the poor, she makes the historically feminine virtue of charity 
the end of her science. Loudon notes that the title of “Lady” meant, in Old Saxon, “bread 
giver,” and was acquired through handing out bread to the poor at the city gates daily.292 
Philanthropic economy understood in this light makes the political the responsibility of 
women whose public duties were confined to charitable action. Women contribute to the 
abolition of the Corn Laws and the improvement of the lives of the poor by circulating 
the ideas of philanthropic economy throughout the ranks of society.   
When Marcet, Martineau, and Loudon wrote on political economy, they wrote in 
part to mobilize women to action against the restrictive tariffs which heightened the price 
of their food. It is clear that women listened; as one Morning Chronicle writer noted in 
April of 1845, “[w]hat Mrs. Loudon, Mrs. Marcet, and Miss Martineau have written, it is 
creditable to their countrywomen to have read, understood, and felt.”293 Readers armed 
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themselves with the knowledge of classical political economy conveyed to them by their 
fellow women and threw themselves into the movement to abolish the Corn Laws.294 The 
political-economic theory underpinning their actions was made palatable to them by 
Marcet, Martineau, and Loudon likening it to familiar responsibilities, whether that be 
conversation, domestic economy, or philanthropic activity. 
By orienting their writings towards women, Marcet, Martineau, and Loudon 
deviate significantly from Malthus. Malthus wrote on the Corn Laws solely to influence 
MPs (members of parliament) and neglected entirely that a popular audience could be 
engaged in political economic matters. The content of his pamphlets was laden with 
technical terminology off-putting to the novice—but persuasive to the legislator—while 
the three women wrote with a minimum of jargon to facilitate an easy introduction to the 
uninitiated. If Malthus had written for a popular audience, however, his writings would 
still markedly deviate from those of Marcet, Martineau, and Loudon. Malthus 
championed the cause of agricultural protectionism, placing him irreconcilably at odds 
with the free-trade-inclined arguments of the women. 
 
Malthus 
Malthus’ first contribution to the Corn Law debates came in his 1814 pamphlet 
Observations on the Effects of the Corn Laws. At the time of that pamphlet’s publication, 
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parliament was debating whether to revise the 1804 Corn Laws which imposed duties on 
imported grain.295 In the pamphlet Malthus proports to assess the pros and cons of free 
trade and self-sufficiency “with the strictest impartiality,” in order to assist the legislature 
in making a “just and enlightened decision … whatever that decision may be.”296 He 
declines to explicitly take a side by critically evaluating both policies, and prides himself 
for his impartiality.  
In the Observations, Malthus held that a nation with a large manufacturing 
population and all its fertile land occupied, such as England, would not grow an 
independent supply of grain if it freely traded with a nation where the opposite conditions 
prevailed. England would rather trade for cheap grain than spend capital cultivating 
inferior soils to meet domestic demand.297 Free trade would benefit English 
manufacturing for two reasons: (1) it increases foreign demand for English 
manufactures;298 (2) it would lower the price of labor, as Malthus thought that nominal 
wages followed the price of grain, though not instantaneously.299 Free trade would also 
secure a supply of grain uncharacterized by the price fluctuations attendant to a home-
grown supply.300 It is only through prohibiting the unrestricted importation of foreign 
grain that England can be made to forgo these benefits and cultivate poor soils, as such 
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cultivation raises the price of grain above the internationally competitive level.301 
Malthus contends that “few things seem less probable, than that England should naturally 
grow an independent supply of corn … it would incontestably answer to us to support a 
part of our present population on foreign corn.”302 
Malthus argued that duties upon the importation of foreign grain negatively 
impact the economy in six ways. First, they waste national resources by allocating more 
capital to agriculture than necessary to produce the required quantity of grain. Second, 
they reduce the competitiveness of exported commodities, as the high price of grain and 
labor they engender increase costs of production. Third, they check population growth by 
reducing the supply of grain and demand for manufactured commodities from their what 
levels would be if free trade prevailed. Fourth, they must be revised regularly to reflect 
the changing international grain market. Fifth, they would negatively impact agriculture 
by diminishing England’s foreign commerce. Sixth, when high enough, duties engender 
fluctuating domestic grain prices. When the nation has an independent supply of grain, 
excess grain from bountiful harvests cannot be sold in foreign markets because of its high 
price. Consequently, grain gluts the market, causing its price to fall. A glutted grain 
market discourages cultivation, and as a result supply become insufficient to meet 
English demand. This requires grain to be imported to meet domestic demand, the price 
of which increases due to sudden English demand. Furthermore, importing is done at a 
premium because of restrictive duties. Another bountiful harvest would send the price of 
grain spiraling downwards, and the process would repeat itself again. In a protected 
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agricultural market, therefore, the price of grain fluctuates between the low price of a 
glutted market and the high price of grain subject to import duties.303 
Just as tariffs on foreign grain are attended by detrimental consequences, so too 
does free trade have drawbacks. With England producing manufactures to trade for grain, 
the nation becomes susceptible to the fluctuations of the domestic and international 
business cycles.304 In consequence, workers in manufacturing become disgruntled on 
account of their oscillating wages.305 Potentially worse than this, however, is the 
precarious state of England’s national security under free trade. A nation dependent upon 
foreign grain runs the risk of having its food supply cut off during wartime. And yet, the 
risk is not very significant. Even when dealing with enemies, grain-producing nations 
have a vested interest in uninterrupted profits. If need be, England could purchase grain 
from elsewhere on the world market.306 The number of sellers on the market would have 
increased, as English demand incentivizes the United States and a plurality of nations in 
the Baltic to regularly grow grain for exportation.307 
Malthus ends the Observations by suggesting parliament postpone deciding on the 
Corn Laws on account of “the deliberation which the subject naturally requires, but more 
particularly on account of the present uncertain state of the currency.” If this advice is not 
heeded, parliament should replace the 1804 Corn Laws with a fixed duty on imported 
grain, “not to act as a prohibition, but as a protecting, and at the same time, profitable 
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tax.”308 Though Malthus refused to endorse either free trade or self-sufficiency in 1814, 
the next year would see him take a decisive stand in favor of an independent supply of 
grain. 
In The Grounds of an Opinion on the Policy of Restricting the Importation of 
Foreign Corn (1815), Malthus argued that the imposition of tariffs calculated to secure 
England an independent supply of gain is preferable to removing trade restrictions and 
opening English ports. His new opinion came in response to the enactment of restrictions 
on French grain which prohibited exportation when the price rose above 49 shillings per 
quarter. Malthus thought France would be England’s main source of foreign grain 
because of its close vicinity and cheap produce. Due to the new regulation, England’s 
supply would be cut off during French seasons of scarcity. It would be impossible, 
Malthus now held, to regain that supply suddenly through other channels. Relaxing 
English import restrictions would compromise national security.309 
The question was no longer free trade or protection, as other nations restricted or 
taxed their exports. Aside from France, Malthus now recognized that the Baltic nations 
heavily taxed their exported grain in proportion to the demand for it.310 Abolishing 
England’s grain restrictions would not obtain free trade, as the concurrent cooperation of 
other trading partners would not be secured. It was “entirely out of our power … to 
obtain a free trade in corn … whatever may be our wishes on the subject.”311 While the 
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principles of political economy advise nations to devote production to the sectors and 
industries to which their circumstances are most suited, and to freely trade commodities 
with one another, reality demands that an alternative course must be taken.312 
In the absence of free trade, the best alternative is to rely upon Great Britain’s 
own capacity to produce grain and thereby secure self-sufficiency. The high price of 
English grain during the Napoleonic Wars induced a large amount of capital to be 
allocated to agriculture. The amount of marginal land under cultivation had been 
expanded, and technological innovation had been stimulated.313 By keeping the price of 
grain high, import restrictions would perpetuate these processes and further increase 
agricultural production. The resulting “quantity of additional produce would be immense, 
and would afford the means of subsistence to a very great increase of population.”314 In 
contrast, unrestricted foreign imports would drastically lower the price of grain, put 
marginal land out of cultivation, check technological innovation in agriculture, and 
destroy large amounts of agricultural capital across the country.315 England would 
become dependent upon foreign grain, as production from the remaining land under 
cultivation would be insufficient to meet domestic demand in average seasons. Large 
numbers of agricultural workers would become unemployed, and many farmers would be 
ruined. 
In Grounds, Malthus continued to maintain that nations with import restrictions 
are subject to fluctuations in the price of grain, but he now held that England would 
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experience more drastic fluctuations by abolishing its restrictions.316 Initially, the price of 
grain would be low as cheap French imports dominate the market. But when France 
prohibits exports during scarcities, the price of English grain would spike in response to 
unfilled demand. Marginal English lands that had been abandoned would take too much 
time to re-cultivate. England would be forced to obtain grain from nations like in the 
Baltic, which sell their produce at enormous prices in times of dire need.317 The price 
would continue to be high until France returned to exporting grain. English marginal land 
would likely not be taken under cultivation in anticipation French exportation resuming. 
If marginal land was cultivated in response to the high price of grain, it would be 
abandoned when England imports French grain, as marginal land has a higher cost of 
production.  To this peace-time fluctuation Malthus adds the wartime fluctuation resultant 
from more conflict with France.318 Adhering to a system of import restrictions would 
secure steadier grain prices.319 
In short, Grounds saw Malthus argue that “a system of restrictions so calculated 
as to keep us, in average years, nearly independent of foreign supplies of corn, will more 
effectually conduce to the wealth and prosperity of the country, and of by far the greatest 
mass of the inhabitants, than the opening of our ports for the free admission of foreign 
corn, in the actual state of Europe.”320 This contention was a radical dissention from the 
other political economists, who then argued invariably for the abolition of the Corn Laws. 
The consensus in favor of abolishing the Corn Laws was so widespread that Ricardo 
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referred to Malthus’ views as “dangerous heresy” in a December 18, 1819 letter to 
McCulloch.321 Hence Malthus sustained serious damage to his reputation because of his 
defense of protective tariffs on grain. As his biographer Patricia James wrote, after his 
support of the Corn Laws it was “even easier than it had been before to make Mr. 
Malthus seem like an ogre who wanted large families of little children to be starved into 
extinction.”322 
The economist Samuel Hollander has argued that Malthus recanted his 
protectionist views later in life.323 For support of this argument he raises several pieces of 
evidence. First, Hollander notes that Malthus deleted several passages reiterating his 
protectionist stance in the second edition of the Principles of Political Economy (1836), 
and suggests he had not gotten around to revising the remaining protectionist passages 
near the end of the book before his death.324 Second, Hollander points to Malthus’ 1824 
article in the Quarterly Review which argued that in spite of the “superior importance of 
food and raw materials … [i]t does not follow … that any forced encouragement should 
be given to agriculture,” because it “would probably defeat the very end in view.”325 
Third, Hollander raises the footnote in the sixth edition of the Essay on the Principle of 
Population (1826) stating:  
at a period when our ministers are most laudably setting an example of a more 
liberal system of commercial policy, it would be greatly desirable that foreign 
nations should not have so marked an exception as our present corn-laws to cast 
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in our teeth. A duty on importation not too high, and a bounty nearly such as was 
recommended by Mr. Ricardo, would probably be best suited to our present 
situation, and best secure steady prices. A duty on foreign corn would resemble 
the duties laid by other countries on our manufactures as objects of taxation, and 
would not in the same manner impeach the principles of free trade.326 
 
Hollander maintains that Malthus here referred to implementing Ricardo’s policy 
package involving a non-protecting tariff and drawback hinging on the differential 
taxation of corn, and not simply the lowering of an existing protective tariff.327 Finally, 
Hollander considers’ Malthus’ correspondence. In a letter to Senior dated March 31, 
1829, Malthus argued that an increase of real wages due to free trade would be desirable 
provided the working-class exercise moral restraint to prevent falling wages. Such a 
period “during which the pressure of population is lightened, though it may not be of long 
duration, is a period of comparative ease, and ought by no means to be thrown out of our 
consideration.”328 Next, a letter to Thomas Chalmers of March 6, 1832 simply stated “I 
quite agree with you in regard to the moral advantage of repealing the corn laws.”329 Last, 
Malthus states in the January 22, 1833 letter to Marcet that he was “for the removal of the 
restrictions [on imported grain], though not without fear of the consequences.”330 The 
consequences Malthus feared were that nominal wages would decrease with the price of 
grain, leaving workers disappointed, while in the short-term many will be thrown out of 
work as the nation adjusts to free trade. 
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Taking his evidence collectively, Hollander presents a persuasive case that 
Malthus repudiated his protectionism.331 Yet the view that Malthus remained a 
protectionist vis-à-vis the Corn Laws to the end of his life reigned strong to his 
contemporaries. Much of the blame can be placed upon Malthus’ failure to complete the 
second edition of his Principles of Political Economy, if, as Hollander suggests, he would 
have removed the remaining protectionist passages. In such a case, had Malthus explicitly 
pointed out the revisions, his new view could not have remained a secret. Yet there is 
another reason to consider: Malthus had been blacklisted by the Edinburgh Review 
because of his protectionism and subsequently turned to the Tory Quarterly Review. Had 
Malthus been more public about his new position, he would have opened himself up to 
charges of treachery. Hollander suggests his reluctance to do more to publicize his 
change of heart is best understood in these terms.332 
Malthus’ protectionist views stand in stark contrast to the views expressed by 
Marcet, Martineau, and Loudon in favor of free trade. The three women maintained that 
national security was not put at risk by removing restrictions on imported grain. They 
held that grain supplies suddenly cut off during wartime could be readily acquired 
elsewhere on the world market. They did not consider France to be a potential trading 
partner for England, and so said nothing about its policy of prohibiting exports during 
scarcities. They considered the world market to be a place of free and open exchange 
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aside from England’s import restrictions. To acquire a steady source of cheap grain free 
from price fluctuations, they advocated for the abolition of the Corn Laws. 
 
The Case Against the Corn Laws 
While all three women maintained that the Corn Laws raised the price of grain in 
England above the level set by international competition, as did Malthus, the precise 
mechanism through which the price of grain rises is elaborated upon best by Marcet. For 
Marcet, the Corn Laws raise the price of grain by making cultivators resort to marginal 
lands. Land can be divided into different degrees of fertility, from the most productive 
plots to stony soils to certain marshlands whose productivity can be said to be zero.333 By 
placing restrictions on the importation of foreign grain, the Corn Laws force more of 
England’s land to be put under cultivation to meet the population’s demand for grain. 
When all of a country’s most fertile soils are occupied, land of an inferior quality will be 
cultivated to meet the demand of that part of England’s large population whose needs had 
not been met by cultivating soils of the most fertile type. Inferior, or marginal, land 
requires more labor to raise grain on it; more manure, for example, is required.334 
Because grain raised on land of inferior quality requires more labor than grain raised on 
more fertile land, its cost of production is higher. In Marcet’s words, the “expense that 
has been bestowed on a commodity in order to bring it to a saleable state” is greater.335 
The price of grain—which is uniform for all produce—must be sufficient to repay grain’s 
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cost of production on the least fertile soils, or else it would not be cultivated. It is 
therefore the cost of production of grain grown on the least fertile land which regulates 
the price of all grain.336 By consequence, every new degree of marginal soil brought 
under cultivation, by increasing the cost of production of grain, increases the price of 
grain.337 The Corn Laws, then, may be said to increase the price of grain by forcing 
marginal land into cultivation to meet England’s demand for grain. 
Loudon also made the connection between cultivating marginal soils and the 
rising price of grain. She too argues that it is the cost of production on marginal soils 
which has this effect. As she notes, England spends 80 million pounds on domestic grain 
when grain could be purchased in foreign markets at a much cheaper price. On average, 
England pays 30 million more pounds for grain than if the same quantity had been 
obtained from other countries. Of this sum, 27 million is sunk in forcing marginal soils to 
produce grain. Consumers are therefore compelled to repay the farmers the 27 million 
through the artificially high price of grain.338 Therefore it is the extra cost of cultivating 
marginal land which occasions the high price of grain.339  
Martineau agreed with Marcet and Loudon that the Corn Laws raise the price of 
grain, and similarly for her it is the cost of production which regulates this high price. 
Estimating a much lower sum than Loudon, she bemoans the fact that the people of 
England pay a total of 12.5 million pounds more for grain than if England adhered to a 
policy of free trade. Compounding the tragedy, she estimated that all but 625,000 pounds 
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of that sum is sunk in forcing marginal land to produce grain. As that 625,000 goes into 
the pockets of the landlords, farmers must sink their profits into forcing a scanty crop to 
rise from poor soil.340 This is the case with her character Farmer Anderson, whose profits 
are buried in “useless drains and fences, and in stony soils,” indicating that he is 
cultivating marginal lands.341 As marginal lands are not cultivated unless their produce 
will repay the cost of production, it is the cost of production on the furthest degree of 
inferior soil which regulates the price of grain.342 
The three women do not have a consensus on the effect of the high price of grain 
on worker’s wages. Marcet asserts that by raising the price of grain, the Corn Laws in 
turn cause worker’s wages to rise. For Marcet, wages must rise as the price of grain rises 
to ensure that workers can live. But the rising wages of labor do not better the working 
classes’ conditions of life, for these wages only enables workers to subsist at the higher 
price of the necessities of life.343  
In contrast, Loudon argues instead that worker’s wages were unable to keep pace 
with the rising price of grain. For Loudon, the wages of labor set by market competition 
are insufficient to reproduce worker’s conditions of life because of the high price of 
provisions artificially created by the Corn Laws. In response, workers extend their 
workday, laboring for 16 out of the 24 hours in a day. Yet they remain poor despite 
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continuously creating wealth on account of their low wages.344 Here Loudon distances 
herself from Malthus, as Malthus argued nominal wages follow the price of grain.  
Martineau would seem to fall somewhere between Marcet and Loudon on this 
issue. In her novella “Sowers not Reapers,” the manufacturing capitalist Oliver complains 
that his capital is spent ensuring his worker’s wages are sufficient to purchase grain at its 
unnaturally high price conditioned by the Corn Laws. Since all the worker’s wages are 
spent procuring grain for subsistence, there remains nothing to spend on manufactured 
goods; Oliver thus warns that capitalists might emigrate to where grain is cheap in order 
to have regular demand for their commodities and to secure profits on their capital.345 Yet 
Martineau also argued that forcing England’s population to subsist on grain cultivated 
from marginal soils guarantees that either a number of citizens will die outright of hunger 
or that a much larger number will be made to subsist upon grain insufficient for their 
numbers. She thus argues paradoxically that wages rise to keep pace with the price of 
grain at the same time that the price of grain ensures starvation or inadequate 
nourishment.346 Martineau cannot pinpoint a social class which would physiologically 
suffer because of the high price of grain. It is not workers, who have wages adequate 
enough to subsist as they did prior to the rise. If not workers, who fronts the burden of the 
high price of grain? It is certainly not landlords or capitalists, who have accumulated 
fortunes shielding them from the brunt of grain’s high price as an umbrella shields one 
from a rainstorm. Nowhere in her writings is there an answer to this conundrum. 
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With Martineau, Loudon held that the Corn Laws stunt the accumulation of 
capital. The laws contract the home market by restricting transactions to life’s first 
necessities. Consumers confine their activities to purchasing grain at its artificially high 
price, as it is all they can afford. Capital, in Loudon’s words, is “like so much seed, 
without a field in which it may be sown, with a fair hope of increase.”347 For this reason 
manufacturing capital’s demand for labor decreases, causing individuals to underbid each 
other for employment in a labor market overstocked with workers.348 Capital’s inability 
to accumulate under the Corn Laws, in other words, causes low wages for the working 
class. 
One effect of grain’s high price is to render it unsalable in foreign markets during 
seasons of superabundance. For Marcet, Martineau, and Loudon, in foreign markets 
where the price of grain is low, England’s produce cannot sell unless at a loss to 
farmers.349 Only Marcet elaborated upon the consequences of this fact. She argues that 
the only alternative is to restrict the sale of produce to the national realm, glutting the 
market and sending the price of grain spiraling downwards. In such cases, farmers who 
cultivate marginal soils will let their lands lie fallow to avoid ruin. In consequence, less 
grain will be cultivated in succeeding seasons than demand calls for, resulting in dearth 
or famine injurious to the population. Farmers will eventually respond by recultivating 
their marginal lands. When another bountiful season occurs, the cycle will be set in 
motion again. In a protected agricultural market, then, the price of grain will be 
continually fluctuating between the low price of a glutted market and the high price of 
 
347 Loudon, Philanthropic Economy, 85. 
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349 [Marcet,] Conversations, 386-7; Martineau, Illustrations, 357-8; Loudon, Philanthropic Economy, 70, 
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scarcity.350 In average seasons, the cost of grain will be higher than the internationally 
competitive price according to its high cost of production on the most inferior soils. 
Marcet advocated for the unrestricted importation of grain to lower its price in English 
markets and avoid the volatility characteristic of a protected agricultural market. 
 Attributing the fluctuations of the agricultural market to the Corn Laws is 
complicated by the fact that, before 1828, these laws allowed for the free importation of 
grain when the price in English markets reached 80 shillings per quarter or higher.351 This 
provision, it could be argued, alleviated the English agricultural market in times of 
scarcity. Marcet and Martineau both found fault on ground of political economy with the 
importation of grain only in times of scarcity. Marcet argued that agricultural countries 
will sell their produce at extremely high prices when imports are allowed only during 
scarcity. Without regular international demand, those countries will not cultivate grain in 
excess of their national demand in order to avoid glutting their markets. They will only 
have the capacity to sell the grain meant for home consumption, at anything resembling a 
market price. Beyond this, they would be willing to sell abroad at nothing less than 
exorbitant prices.352 If they had regular demand for their produce, they would cultivate as 
much grain as possible to export at the price set by international competition and make a 
profit. 
 
350 [Marcet,] Conversations, 387. 
351 An 1828 act introduced a sliding-scale tariff which levied a duty of 34 shillings when the price fell to 52 
shillings per quarter or below, 13 shillings and 8 pence when at 69 shillings, and 1 shilling per quarter when 
the price rose to 73 shillings or above. Martineau critiqued the sliding-scale because it induced farmers to 
speculate on the price of grain, often to ruinous ends. See Martineau, Illustrations, 368. 
352 [Marcet,] Hopkins’s Notions, 185-6. 
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Martineau argues that trade deals agreed upon during times of panic, such as bad 
harvest seasons, will be harmful to the English economy. In “Sowers not Reapers,” the 
starving city of Sheffield agrees to import grain during a period of acute agricultural 
distress. England’s trading partners levied heavy duties on the grain because (1) England 
was in a weak bargaining position; and (2) the grain traded was part of the stock meant 
for home consumption, not surplus grain grown regularly for exportation. Compounding 
the harmful effects of importing grain at a premium, the precise amount of grain 
necessary to quell the suffering of the English economy cannot be ascertained. Grain is 
over-imported in a panic, so that its price falls to 50 shillings per quarter and much of it 
lies unsold, glutting the market. Sellers are forced to obtain drawbacks on what they 
imported to export it at a loss rather than let it remain unsold.353 
On the whole, the three women’s arguments against the Corn Laws converge 
except with respect to worker’s wages. With Malthus, Marcet and Martineau held that 
nominal wages follow the price of grain, as grain (specifically wheaten-bread) constitutes 
the principal wage-good on which wage-earners spend their income. Loudon dissented 
not only from Malthus, Marcet, and Martineau by arguing nominal wages were low when 
the price of grain was high, but also from all political economists; until the mid-1840s, 
they were united in arguing that the two act in concert.354 Despite this point of contention, 
Marcet, Martineau, and Loudon all advocate for the same remedy for the failings of 
agricultural protection; namely, free trade. 
 
353 Martineau, Illustrations, 357. 
354 According to Mark Blaug, “[f]or the most part, the economists now [in the mid-1840s] agreed that the 
rate of wages did not vary with the price of food and that repeal would not necessarily produce a fall in 
money wages.” See Mark Blaug, “The Empirical Content of Ricardian Economics,” Journal of Political 
Economy 61, no. 1 (February 1956), 54, https://doi.org/10.1086/257744. 
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Free Trade 
In contrast to the protected agricultural market and all its attendant flaws, Marcet, 
Martineau, and Loudon advocate for free trade in grain between England and the world. 
This would guarantee England could acquire a supply of grain sufficient to meet national 
demand at the low price commanded by international competition. At the same time, it 
would shield the country from the fluctuations of the system demanding a home supply of 
grain. By purchasing grain imported from countries where produce has a low cost of 
production, England can devote the labor-time saved from not producing grain on 
marginal soils to the creation of some other commodity which the country demands.355 At 
the same time, consumers can spend the money saved from not purchasing protected 
English grain on other commodities they require. Doing so creates demand for labor on 
behalf of the workers who create the purchased commodities, ensuring employment in 
the manufacturing sector for those who seek it.356 With consumers acquiring grain from 
international trade, farmers can convert the marginal land previously used for grain 
cultivation into pastureland to increase the supply and lower the price of meat, milk, 
butter, and cheese.357 Alternately, landlords can convert their marginal farmland into real 
estate for England’s large population.358 The benefits of a free trade for grain accrue to a 
number of social classes. Under free trade, manufacturers have a greater demand for 
labor and more capital accumulation than under a system of restriction. Workers also 
benefit, as they find greater employment in manufacturing. Farmers no longer struggle to 
cultivate grain on soils with a high cost of production and can devote their labor-time 
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elsewhere. Finally, landlords may convert their marginal soils to more lucrative real 
estate. 
Marcet, Martineau, and Loudon envisage a scenario where England produces 
manufactured goods to trade with agricultural nations that excel in producing grain. Their 
ideal trading partners are countries which have capital and population small enough 
relative to their size to confine their activities to agriculture. As Marcet notes, 
manufactures are only established in countries which have large amounts of capital and a 
population such as that of England, which must find employment for large numbers. 
Countries like the United States,359 Poland,360 and Russia,361 being either newly 
established or slow in the progress of capital and population, attain full employment 
solely in the agricultural sector and export produce in exchange for manufactured goods. 
In those countries there exists a plethora of fertile land which can be employed to raise 
grain with only a small cost of production. England’s population is too great to be 
maintained by the produce of its soils in average seasons, so it will find it advantageous 
to import some quantity of the grain it consumes in exchange for the manufactured goods 
its population produces.362 England is a small island with a limited surface, but it excels 
in converting raw materials into manufactured goods. For Loudon, it ought to exchange 
those manufactured goods for the raw produce in stands in need of from countries with 
nothing else to offer.363 By this manner England would attain full employment for its 
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working class, who no longer would have to underbid each other in an glutted labor 
market. They would find greater work for their numbers and wages able to secure 
subsistence at reasonable prices.364 
 
Landlords and the Corn Laws 
The only way to repeal the Corn Laws within the existing socio-political framework of 
England was to get a majority of MPs to vote them out of existence. As a prerequisite for 
being an MP was to own land, Marcet, Martineau, and Loudon all must contend with 
getting landlords on their side. This was not an easy task, given that landlords stood to 
benefit most from the continuance of the Corn Laws. This was because the Corn Laws 
increased the rents on their properties. To explain why, it is useful to clarify why rent is 
paid in the first place. 
Suppose a group of settlers encounter a vacant island while traveling by boat. 
Suppose further that the settlers decide to stay on the island and develop a community. 
Some of the settlers will devote themselves to farming and will have no trouble finding 
premium quality land with a low cost of production to farm. In time capital and 
population will increase, and new land will have to be taken under cultivation. When all 
the most fertile land is in use, land of inferior quality will be cultivated to secure 
subsistence for our island’s growing population. Our first generation of farmers will be in 
possession of the best quality land which affords the greatest returns on capital and will 
accumulate their fortunes most quickly. Let us suppose that they will make 30 percent, 
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while our new generation of settlers makes only 20 percent. Because the first generation 
cultivates rent-free and has the most fertile soil, it is not improbable that they will seek to 
cease farming near the end of their lives while still desiring to hold onto their property. 
They will readily find individuals willing to pay an annual sum to cultivate their lands 
rather than cultivate soils of a more inferior quality. These individuals become their 
tenants, and pay, let us suppose, 10 percent to use the land. Therefore, the profits of our 
tenants are 20 percent, which is equal to the profits of our second generation of settlers 
who are both farmers and proprietors. As capital and population continue to progress, the 
island’s demand for grain will increase, and land of even more inferior quality will be 
required to be brought under cultivation. Let us suppose this new land will not yield 
above 10 percent profits. Then our second generation of settlers will be able to find 
tenants for their land, as it will be just as advantageous for a farmer to pay 10 percent 
while making 20 percent as it is to pay nothing while cultivating land that yields no more 
than 10 percent. As soon as the leases of our previous tenants expire, their landlords will 
stipulate that they make no more than 10 percent to go along with the competitive rate. 
Our first generation of settlers will now make 20 percent in rent, while their tenants’ 
profits are reduced by 10 percent. It can be seen that every new degree of marginal land 
under cultivation has the double effect of raising rents and reducing profits on capital at 
the same time as it raises the cost of production, and therefore the price, of grain.365 By 
forcing the cultivation of marginal lands, the Corn Laws increase rents, decrease profits 
on capital, and raise the price of grain. 
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 Given that, at the time of the passage of the Corn Laws, one had to be a 
landowner to vote in parliament, and the Corn Laws had the effect of raising rents, it 
seems likely that landowners voted in the Corn Laws to maintain the profits they 
accumulated during the Napoleonic Wars. At that time, as conflict drew to a close it was 
predicted that grain would enter English markets at a much lower price than it was sold 
for during wartime, when bad harvests all across Europe and the restrictive impacts of the 
continental blockade sharply raised the price of grain. Depending on the continuation of 
high prices, landowners had heavily invested in the improvement of marginal land and 
had leased farms at proportionally higher rates. The Corn Law of 1815, establishing 
protection on agriculture, was tuned to the abnormal scale of prices prevailing in 1815, 
ensured landowners could keep up their rents on marginal soils, and propped up the high 
price of grain.366 
 Loudon recognized that landlords had voted in the Corn Laws at the expense of 
other classes, and as a result was, of the three women writers, the most hostile towards 
them. She argued that landowners voted against living on the fair market price of their 
land and instead made up the deficiency at the expense of the rest of the nation—out of 
the wages of workers, the profits of farmers, the incomes of annuitants, and the ruin of 13 
million people dependent upon manufactures.367 As a result, wealth is transferred from 
workers and capitalists to landlords whose land 
thus rendered not national property, but a tool of national oppression; not an 
addition to her national income, but an addition to her national debt … all that 
[Great Britain’s] landowners do receive as rent become nothing more, neither 
less, than an unjust transfer to the landowners, of the creations of the labour, and 
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the profits on the capital of other classes; so that, in fact, for agricultural purposes, 
the whole of the land of Great Britain is thus rendered, in the present state of 
European markets, worth, to the nation, less than nothing.368 
 
Hyperbole aside, Loudon appealed to landlord’s self-interest to get them to think of 
repeal as being in their best interests. With the advent of free trade, landlords, she argues, 
should be inclined to convert their marginal land into real estate and to erect houses to 
lease to England’s large population. By this manner the value of the landlord’s property 
would increase even without an increase in cottage rent, as the lowest value of real estate 
is much higher than the highest price of agricultural land.369 Just as self-interest had been 
the determining factor in enacting the Corn Laws, it would prove the decisive element in 
repeal. In this sense Loudon is a disciple of Adam Smith, who famously argued one can 
only be successful in influencing others by appealing to their self-interest: “is not from 
the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but in 
regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-
love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their own advantages.”370 
 Martineau also appealed to landlord’s sense of self-interest when attempting to 
persuade them to adopt the cause of repeal. She argued that their revenues fluctuate 
according to the fluctuations in the price of grain. In seasons of scarcity and an 
abnormally high price of grain, their revenues rise as their tenants make more profit, 
while in seasons of abundance with a low price of grain, their revenues fall as their 
tenants glut the market with produce and have falling profits. By establishing a free trade 
 
368 Ibid., 87-8. 
369 Ibid., 168. 
370 Smith, Wealth of Nations, 1:18. 
117 
 
in grain, revenues become stabilized through importing and exporting grain according to 
the situation of the home market in all seasons. Landowners no longer suffer fluctuating 
revenues or tenant hardships.371 
 Only Marcet fails to provide an argument as to why it would be beneficial for 
landlords to repeal the Corn Laws. Instead she places her faith in the enlightened 
legislator who pursues the general interest of his country even if he stands to lose from it. 
The landlord in John Hopkins’s Notions on Political Economy is emblematic of this 
figure, as it is he who convinces the protagonist of the benefits of unrestricted foreign 
trade. Even if the landlord’s revenue is lessened through the repeal of the Corn Laws, he 
puts the needs of his society before his own and does what most benefits his nation.372 
 Either by appealing to their self-interest or to their enlightened sensibilities, 
Marcet, Martineau, and Loudon attempted to persuade landowners that the repeal of the 
Corn Laws would be in their best interests. By doing so they appealed directly to the 
group of individuals most able to effect repeal: members of parliament. Through 
attempting to persuade MPs, the three women’s writings performed a similar function to 
Malthus’ Corn Law tracts, as he also wrote to influence the legislature. This is one of the 
few similarities between the writings of the two camps, barring Malthus’ later conversion 
to the side of free trade. 
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Conclusion 
There are significant differences between the arguments of Malthus’ Corn Law 
pamphlets and the arguments espoused by women political economists. Marcet, 
Martineau, and Loudon mobilized women to action against the Corn Laws through 
likening political economy to their traditional responsibilities. Malthus did not write for a 
popular audience. The women argued that the Corn Laws raising of the price of grain 
stunts capital accumulation in manufacturing, while agriculture becomes subject to 
violent fluctuations between the low cost of a glutted market and the high price of acute 
scarcity. Malthus made no such argument about capital accumulation, though he did 
argue the protected agriculture market is characterized by fluctuating grain prices. 
However, for Malthus the price fluctuates between the low price of a glutted market and 
the high price resultant from importing grain subject to duties, not the high price of 
scarcity. Moreover, he held that England would be subject to greater fluctuations if it 
abolished its tariffs due to France’s policy of prohibiting exportation during scarcity. 
Marcet, Martineau, and Loudon advocated for free trade in grain between agricultural 
nations and England to secure a number of economic benefits, foremost of which are low 
and steady grain prices. Malthus advocated for England to adopt heavy import 
restrictions to secure an independent supply of grain, primarily for reasons of national 
security. The women envisaged England producing manufactured goods to trade for 
grain, which would create demand for labor in the manufacturing sector and ensure 
greater employment to the working class. For Loudon, this raises the wages of labor, but 
for Martineau and Marcet, free trade is likely to lower wages raised because of the high 
price of provisions under the Corn Laws. Malthus envisaged England cultivating 
significant amounts of marginal land to produce grain for its own consumption. This 
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would raise the wages of labor proportionally to the increase in the price of grain. For 
Malthus, rising wages increases production costs for capitalists, whose manufactures lose 
competitiveness with their foreign counterparts. Marcet and Martineau, who believed the 
Corn Laws raised wages, neglected this drawback of import restrictions. The women also 
denied that free trade could have negative effects on the English economy, whereas 
Malthus argued abolishing import restrictions comes with its own set of harmful 
consequences. In the final analysis, women political economists’ arguments were 
incongruent with Malthus’ views on the Corn Laws. 
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V. DEVIATION FROM MALTHUS EXPLAINED 
This thesis has found that women had an ambivalent relationship with Malthus’ political 
economy. They distilled his principle of population into their didactic literature, urging 
individuals to prevent population from outstripping resources. They popularized his 
arguments against the Poor Laws, but supplemented them with original contentions and 
later advocated for reforms inconsonant with Malthus’ abolitionism. Finally, they sought 
the eradication of the protectionist Corn Laws which Malthus maintained (until his 
recantation) would be beneficial to the English economy. It remains to be explained why 
women—Marcet and Martineau specifically—diverged sharply from Malthus’ views on 
the Corn Laws when they adhered to his principle of population and anti-Poor law 
arguments. Marcet and Martineau deviated from Malthus on the Corn Laws because the 
two took their cues from other on that issue. Specifically, Marcet was influenced Smith’s 
conception of foreign trade in the Wealth of Nations when insisting upon the 
inexpediency of protective tariffs. Martineau’s stance on the issue was shaped by Mill’s 
Elements of Political Economy. Marcet and Martineau’s deviation from Malthus is due to 
the overriding influence of other political economists. 
 
Marcet 
In the preface to the first edition to the Conversations on Political Economy, Marcet 
admits that “the principles and materials of the work … have been obtained from the 
writings of the great masters who have treated this subject, and more particularly from 
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those of Dr. Adam Smith, of Mr. Malthus, M. Say, and M. Sismondi.”373 An examination 
of the Conversations reveals Marcet adopted an assortment of principles from their works 
in a seemingly arbitrary manner. For instance, she chose to exposit Malthus’ conception 
of population while ignoring the significant portion of Sismondi’s 1815 entry on political 
economy in the Edinburgh Encyclopedia that had been devoted to critiquing Malthus’ 
principle.374 She also adopted Say’s view that exchange value is determined by utility in 
spite of Smith’s labor theory of value. Marcet’s picking and choosing from the works of 
her predecessors extended into her discussion of foreign trade. She discounted Malthus’ 
protectionism and instead let Smith’s laissez-faire policy guide her views. 
 In the Wealth of Nations, Smith maintained that import restrictions are 
unconducive to the welfare of society when they discourage or prohibit the purchase of 
foreign commodities which can be had for cheaper than it costs to produce in the home 
market. Such restrictions reduce the value of the nation’s annual produce by diverting 
capital to industries where a monopoly over the home market is assured. By this manner 
the price of the protected commodity rises, while the wealth of the nation is lessened. The 
more expedient policy is to not interfere with the market, and to purchase inexpensive 
foreign commodities with the produce of the nation derived from the advantageous 
allocation of capital.375 
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 It is this view of foreign trade which forms the backbone of Marcet’s treatment of 
import restrictions. She insists that restrictions on the importation of foreign commodities 
are inadvisable because they raise prices to a higher level than elsewhere on the world 
market by guaranteeing producers a monopoly over the home market. As capital is drawn 
into the protected industry, it is driven away from those areas most conducive to the 
“wealth, prosperity, and enjoyments” of the nation.376 Thus, the annual produce of the 
nation is diminished. It is better for nations to employ their capital where it is most 
advantageous and to purchase commodities where they can be had cheapest.377 This end 
is attained by letting capital and consumption operate free of restriction. The natural 
working of the market should not be interfered with. 
 Smith thus set the tone on import restrictions which Marcet followed. Of course, 
not all of Marcet’s arguments against tariffs are reducible to Smith’s insistence upon the 
benefits of unrestricted foreign trade. Some of her case against the Corn Laws appears to 
have been generated independent of any direct influence, and therefore attests to her 
ingenuity. But it remains that she had been heavily influenced by Smith’s laissez-faire 
approach to foreign trade. It is that influence which accounts for her deviation from 
Malthus. 
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Martineau 
In “The Moral of Many Fables,” Martineau confesses that her political economy owes 
much to “Smith and Malthus, and others of their high order.”378 An examination of 
Martineau’s Illustrations reveals reliance upon not only Smith’s Wealth of Nations and 
Malthus’ Essay on the Principle of Population, but Mill’s Elements of Political Economy. 
The order in which Martineau’s tales appeared followed the order of the four main 
categories laid out by Mill’s Elements: production, distribution, interchange, and 
consumption. The content of Martineau’s Illustrations was similarly dependent upon 
Mills’ treatise—the wage fund doctrine so central to “Cousin Marshall” is traceable to 
Mill’s treatment of wages, for instance. It is Martineau’s adherence to Mills’ exposition 
of Ricardian political economy that accounts for her vacillating allegiance to Malthus’ 
views. Mill’s conception of population was an adaptation of Malthus’ principle, and 
Martineau mixed ideas from both. Mill declined to comment upon the effects of the Poor 
Laws, which set the stage for Malthus’ arguments and Martineau’s ingenuity to fill the 
gap. Finally, Mill criticized defenders of the Corn Laws and maintained that a free trade 
in grain would be most beneficial to the English economy. Mill influenced Martineau to 
adopt Malthus’ views on population and the Poor Laws, but also to advocate for the 
abolition of the Corn Laws. 
 With Malthus, Mill held that population has a tendency to increase faster than 
capital. Mill deduces population’s natural rate of increase apriori. Supposing that a 
women’s reproductive period extends from 20 to 40 years of age, and supposing that one 
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birth every two years the natural interval of accouchement, there is time for 10 births 
within a woman’s childbearing years. Allowing for infant mortality to take one-half of 
these children—which Mill holds will be true for parents in comfortable circumstances—
a couple will produce five children.379 Supposing this to be true of all couples, it is 
evident that population will double in only a short period of time.380 
 Against this doubling of population Mill contrasts the law of diminishing returns. 
When, after exhausting land of superior quality, capital is applied to new marginal lands, 
its produce constantly diminishes proportional to its increase. The same is true when 
capital is applied in successive doses to the same land. Capital’s rate of increase is thus 
continually declining, while population’s stays consistently fast. “It thus sufficiently 
appears,” Mill concludes, “that there is a tendency in population to increase faster than 
capital.”381 
 The result of population outpacing capital is the impoverishment of the masses. 
Wages fall, and their continual decrease produces a greater and greater degree of poverty 
among the people. Poverty is attended by the twin Malthusian consequences of misery 
and vice. As poverty, misery, and vice increase, so too does mortality. Mortality is 
especially acute among infants, who are born into a world without the resources to 
sustain them. Death eventually proportions the number of people to the means of 
subsistence, and at that point wages become stabilized.382 
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 The only effectual method to prevent population-driven mortality crises is the 
limitation of births. This is best achieved through the widespread practice of “prudence; 
by which either marriages are sparing contracted, or care is taken that children, beyond a 
certain number shall not be the fruit.”383 Just as Mill’s wage-fertility dynamic is 
attributable to Malthus, his solution to the population problem is likewise derived from 
the reverend. 
 It is manifest that Martineau’s treatment of population is a mixture of Malthus’ 
and Mill’s views. She evidently found the mathematical certainty of Malthus’ 
geometrical ratio more convincing than Mill’s many suppositions when delineating 
population’s rate of increase. Yet she found the law of diminishing returns a useful 
heuristic to demonstrate the inferiority of the growth of capital. Martineau’s blending of 
Malthus and Mill on this issue was fairly seamless as there was little disagreement 
between the two. Yet on the Poor Laws Mill said little, allowing Martineau to adopt and 
append Malthusian doctrine as she saw fit.  
 In terms of the grain trade, Mill maintained that it is beneficial for a nation to 
import foreign commodities which can be purchased at a cheaper price than can be 
procured in the home market. This would secure the best outcome to the importing 
nation, as capital would naturally be allocated to the production of commodities in which 
the nation has an advantage.384 In this way capital is allocated to its most profitable 
sectors. Restrictions upon the importation of grain are inexpedient because they prevent 
this outcome from occurring.  
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Mill takes pains to discredit the arguments of those who advocate for England to 
produce an independent supply of grain. First, he considers the argument that importing 
nations may be deprived of their grain supplies by hostile neighbors. Mill counters this on 
two fronts: historically, importing nations have enjoyed the most steady and reliable grain 
markets; and principally, obtaining grain from a multiplicity of nations is the best defense 
against unfavorable seasons. By contrast, the nation that grows its own grain is subject to 
marked fluctuations in price resultant from seasons of dearth of famine.385  
The second argument Mill discredits is that protection should be given to grain 
producers on account of protection afforded to manufacturers. To begin with, the logic of 
this argument dictates that if protection should be afforded to agriculture on account of 
protection given to some other industry, protection should be given to all industries. 
Acquiescing to this argument would reduce England’s international trade to solely those 
commodities which it could not produce domestically. Moreover, the argument supposes 
that industries acquire some gain in consequence to their protection, while agriculture 
sustains a loss on account of being unprotected. According to Mill, protection does not 
come with an attendant economic benefit such as increased returns on capital. The only 
consequence to protection is that it induces more capitalists to enter that branch of 
industry with which it interferes. As industry derives no gain from protection, no loss is 
incurred by agriculture. The market for grain is not diminished because restrictions are 
imposed upon the importation of woolens, nor would that market expand if the 
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restrictions were abolished. Thus, agriculture is not impacted by protection given to other 
industries.386 
Finally, Mill contends with the argument advanced by landlords that farmers and 
manufacturers benefit from restrictions on the importation of grain. He holds that whether 
farmers and manufacturers benefit from the Corn Laws can be ascertained by examining 
how the laws impact their profits. The profit of farmers and manufacturers are high when 
wages are low, and low when wages are high. As the Corn Laws increase the price of 
grain—and the rate of wages depends on the price of grain—the Corn Laws increase the 
wages of labor. Increased wages mean decreased profits. Therefore, the Corn Laws 
reduce profits on capital. The true interests of farmers and manufactures lie in the 
abolition of the Corn Laws, as free trade would increase their profits.387  
Mill’s Elements set the pattern which Martineau’s Illustrations followed. On 
population, Mill promulgated a variant of Malthus’ principle. Martineau subsequently 
followed Mill’s lead. Mill’s neglect of the Poor Laws allowed Martineau to adopt the 
views of Malthus, whom Mill evidently saw as an authority on political economy. Mill’s 
anti-Corn Law stance positioned Martineau against protective tariffs on grain in spite of 
Malthus’ opinions to the contrary. 
 
 
 
 
386 Ibid., 203-5. 
387 Ibid., 205-7. 
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Conclusion 
The political economy of Marcet and Martineau was influenced by more than Malthus. 
As popularizations of political economy, it is to be expected that their works drew 
inspiration from a multiplicity of sources. Marcet followed the great master of political 
economy, Adam Smith, in critiquing import restrictions which meddle with the natural 
working of the market. Martineau let James Mill be her guide to political economy, as 
she drew influence from his arguments against the Corn Laws to orient herself against 
tariffs which heighten the price of grain. It is therefore the influence of other political 
economists which accounts for Marcet and Martineau’s deviation from Malthus’ 
protectionism.  
 Malthus was one of the most eminent political economists in England during the 
early 19th century. His Essay on the Principle of Population contained the definitive 
statements of classical political economy on population and the Poor Laws. When writing 
works of political economy, women endeavored to popularize those statements. Yet 
women remained true to the fundamental principle of free trade when Malthus advocated 
for restrictions on grain imports. The influence of Malthus reigns strong in British 
women’s political economy, but it only went so far. 
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